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DISRUPTIVE PHILANTHROPY: CHAN-ZUCKERBERG, THE
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, AND THE MILLIONAIRE
NEXT DOOR
Dana Brakman Reiser*
Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Dr. Priscilla Chan,
have pledged to give 99% of their net worth to—in their words—
“advance[e] human potential and promot[e] equal opportunity.” To make
good on this promise, however, they did not set up a traditional nonprofit,
tax-exempt organization. Instead, they founded the Chan-Zuckerberg
Initiative, a limited liability company (LLC). The bulk of this Article
provides the definitive explanation for this seemingly bizarre choice.
Importantly, the philanthropy LLC structure offers donors the flexibility
to bolster charitable grantmaking with impact investment and political
advocacy, free of the restrictions, penalties, and transparency
requirements applied to tax-exempt vehicles. The LLC form also
provides donors complete control over the organizations they found,
including an ability to reclaim donated assets that is absolutely prohibited
in traditional forms. With careful planning, all of these advantages can be
gained at relatively little tax cost—especially in a post-2017 tax
environment. The philanthropy LLC is poised to spread beyond Silicon
Valley to the millionaire next door, a development with the potential to
do both good and harm. In its concluding section, the Article explores
how a turn to such disruptive philanthropic vehicles can both unleash
tremendous capital for solving society’s most challenging problems and
magnify the influence of its most powerful elites.
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INTRODUCTION
On the occasion of the birth of their first child, Facebook founder and
billionaire Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, pediatrician Dr. Priscilla Chan,
announced they would give 99% of their net worth to “advance human
potential and promote equality for all children in the next generation.”1
They published a long letter to their new daughter, Max, committing to
this massive gift and identifying their “initial areas of focus [as]
personalized learning, curing disease, connecting people and building
strong communities.”2 The letter connected their efforts to their career
experiences as a social media entrepreneur and doctor/educator, and
underscored their sense of responsibility to use their success to improve
the lives of Max’s generation.3 But they did not create a charity to helm
their philanthropic efforts—they formed a limited liability company.
The moment was tender and the letter was heartfelt, yet reactions were
mixed. Many lauded the generosity of Chan and Zuckerberg, linking their
generosity to that of generations of America’s magnates-turned1. Mark Zuckerberg, A Letter to Our Daughter, FACEBOOK (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-letter-to-our-daughter/ 10153375081581634/.
2. Id.
3. See id.
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philanthropists from Carnegie and Rockefeller to Gates and Buffet’s
Giving Pledge.4 Others were skeptical.5
Chan and Zuckerberg were relative novices in the philanthropy world.
Chan had experience working with education and healthcare charities
running back to her college days at least.6 Her latest efforts created The
Primary School, a nonprofit providing free preschool and primary
education integrated with health care services for students in underserved
Bay Area communities.7 This ambitious project, however, was launched
just two months before the couple’s big announcement.8 Zuckerberg had
made his first foray into philanthropy with a huge and much ballyhooed
donation to the Newark public schools in 2010.9 That effort did nothing
to establish his reputation for wisdom and efficacy as a philanthropist—

4. See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Zuckerberg, Gates, Buffett and the Triumph of Competitive
Philanthropy, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2015/12/02/mark-zuckerberg-bill-gates-warren-buffett-and-triumph-of-competitivephilanthropy/?utm_term=.7b510479418e (discussing how Gates and Buffett have created a
philanthropic competition); Bill George, America is in the Midst of a Philanthropic Revolution,
FORTUNE (Jan. 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/01/17/philanthropy-america-zuckerberg-gates/
(noting that American philanthropists are following a long line of benefactors); Bloomberg News,
Zuckerberg Philanthropy Pledge Sets New Giving Standard, PRIVATE WEALTH (Dec. 2, 2015),
https://www.fa-mag.com/news/zuckerberg-philanthropy-pledge-sets-new-giving-standard24088.html (discussing how Zuckerberg’s pledge is in the same league with other billionaires).
5. See, e.g., Leslie Lenkowsky, Ending Philanthropy as We Know It, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3,
2015, at A15 (noting the risks of the LLC structure, and for-profit efforts to solve social problems
more generally, and opining that if CZI “succeeds, it may bring an end to philanthropy as we have
known it”); Jesse Eisinger, How Mark Zuckerberg’s Altruism Helps Himself, PROPUBLICA (Dec.
3, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-mark-zuckerbergs-altruism-helps-himself
(“Mark Zuckerberg did not donate $45 billion to charity. You may have heard that, but that was
wrong.”); David Olive, Zuckerberg’s $46B Charitable Gift Not What it Seems, TORONTO STAR
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/business/2015/12/11/zuckerbergs-46b-charitable-giftnot-what-it-seems.html (“Writ large, these mega-donations by the super-wealthy amount to a
creeping privatization of social-service provision. Or, put another way, they are the removal of
democratic principles from the provision of essential societal needs. This ‘black-box charity’ is
no solution.”).
6. See Queenie Wong, Priscilla Chan, In Rare Interview, Tells How Her Goals with Mark
Zuckerberg Are Shaped by Personal Story, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/04/01/priscilla-chan-in-rare-interview-tells-how-her-goalswith-mark-zuckerberg-are-shaped-by-personal-story/.
7. See Overview, PRIMARY SCH., https://www.theprimaryschool.org/overview/.
8. See Wong, supra note 6.
9. The announcement of his donation was made on The Oprah Winfrey Show, to much
fanfare. See Mark Zuckerberg Announces $100 Million Grant, OPRAH.COM (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://www.oprah.com/own-oprahshow/mark-zuckerbergs-big-announcement-video (providing a
video clip of the broadcast); see also Richard Perez-Pena, Facebook Founder to Donate $100
Million to Help Remake Newark’s Schools, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/education/23newark.html (detailing the gift).
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it was widely regarded as a spectacular failure.10 None of their efforts, of
course, was on anything like the scale of the massive project the couple
dubbed the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative (CZI).
CZI raises questions not only about competence, but also about power.
This is not new. Big philanthropy has long raised concerns about the
power it affords already potent elites. Andrew Carnegie’s announcement
that he planned to give away his fortune over a century ago was met with
concerns about the provenance of his wealth—made on the backs of
workers—and his apparent belief that he was better able to determine
how to improve their lives than they would be.11 When the ranks of
industrialist do-gooders swelled in the early twentieth century, alarm over
greed and paternalism was joined by charges that the foundations they
established were antidemocratic.12 Mid-century, these concerns
culminated in tax reforms intended to prevent the wealthy from abusing
philanthropic tax benefits and further concentrating their economic and
political power through their charitable entities.13 Critiques of elite
philanthropy resurfaced around the expansion of the Gates Foundation,
initiation of the Giving Pledge, and again with CZI. The arguments that
charitable endeavors allow the wealthiest to sanitize their tremendous
advantage and further increase their influence over society are persistent.
By organizing as a limited liability company, the Chan Zuckerberg
Initiative avoids one particularly trenchant strain of this criticism.
Donating funds to CZI does not create an immediate tax write-off for its
founders.14 Chan and Zuckerberg must pay federal and state tax on
income they receive from CZI. They must pay state and local property
taxes on any real estate it owns and sales taxes on any purchases it makes.
If they die owning interests in it, these interests will be part of their
taxable estates. CZI is simply not a tax-exempt institution, and cannot
access the array of subsidies such entities receive.

10. An exhaustive account of the donation and its aftermath can be found in DALE
RUSSAKOFF, THE PRIZE: WHO’S IN CHARGE OF AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (2015).
11. See David Nasaw, Looking the Carnegie Gift Horse in the Mouth: The 19th-Century
Critique of Big Philanthropy, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_
and_politics/history_lesson/2006/11/looking_the_carnegie_gift_horse_in_the_mouth.html.
12. See Rob Reich, On the Role of Foundations in Democracies, in PHILANTHROPY IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 64–65 (Rob Reich et al. eds., 2016) (describing the “fierce criticism” John
D. Rockefeller received for his efforts in the early 1900s to create a philanthropic foundation
perceived as antidemocratic).
13. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 76–80 (2004); John G. Simon, The Regulation of American
Foundations: Looking Backward at the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 6 VOLUNTAS 243, 243–46 (1995).
14. See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/
posts/10102507695055801?pnref=story.
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Still, to some, structuring CZI as an LLC raised alarm bells. Skeptics
were anxious that there must be some nefarious reason for this nongift
gift, prompting Zuckerberg to mount a defense of his unusual
philanthropic vehicle.15 But CZI is not the first philanthropic institution
to adopt a for-profit form,16 and there are numerous benign explanations
for this organizational design.
For-profit vehicles for philanthropy, and particularly the philanthropy
LLC model, provide founders substantial operational flexibility. Unlike
nonprofit, tax-exempt entities, an LLC is free to combine traditional
grantmaking with strategic investments and political advocacy. This
freedom of approach, especially when combined with the far greater
privacy and control an LLC provides, can understandably be worth
trading for foregone tax benefits. The unusual nature of this philanthropic
structure also fits the disruptive mantra that has driven so much of Silicon
Valley’s success.
The remainder of this Article will explore the future of this innovative
structure and its consequences. Part I will describe philanthropy LLCs in
action, first by chronicling the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative’s first years,
and then by connecting it with its predecessors and the broader Silicon
Valley context in which it arose. The next two Parts consider the tradeoffs
inherent in this particular kind of disruptive philanthropy. Part II traces
the advantages philanthropy LLCs offer in operational flexibility,
privacy, and control for founders, as compared with traditional nonprofit
philanthropic vehicles. Part III evaluates the tax benefits a philanthropy
LLC sacrifices, which are not as substantial as might be expected, and
how changes affected by the 2017 tax legislation may further reduce
those benefits. Part IV then asks whether the philanthropy LLC will
remain an exclusive plaything of the ultra-rich, or will be attractive to
other (merely) high-net-worth individuals. It also contemplates the
impact widespread adoption of such structures would have on American
philanthropy and society. Part V briefly concludes.

15. See Zuckerberg, supra note 14 (“By using an LLC instead of a traditional foundation,
we receive no tax benefit from transferring our shares to the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative, but we
gain flexibility to execute our mission more effectively. In fact, if we transferred our shares to a
traditional foundation, then we would have received an immediate tax benefit, but by using an
LLC we do not. And just like everyone else, we will pay capital gains taxes when our shares are
sold by the LLC.”).
16. Although LLC laws typically permit formation for “any lawful purpose,” see Robert
Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations—For-Profits, Nonprofits, and Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 553, 570–72 (2009) (describing these and other limitations), the form and its
widespread use is associated with the for-profit sector.
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I. CZI AND THE PHILANTHROPY LLC MODEL
The Chan Zuckerberg Initiative is a very new organization, but it has
already made some big bets. Its most significant charitable commitment
came about a year after its inception, when CZI announced it would spend
$3 billion on medical research over the next ten years.17 Twenty percent
of this sum funded Biohub, a nonprofit research institution dedicated “to
develop new technologies that will enable doctors to cure, prevent or
manage all diseases during our children’s lifetime.”18 Biohub partnered
with Berkeley, Stanford, and the University of California San Francisco
and inaugurated initiatives to map every type of human cell and to
develop better diagnostic and treatment options for infectious diseases.19
CZI jumped into impact investing too—making investments designed
to achieve a combination of financial and social returns. It made a $24
million investment in Andela, a company that trains engineers in Africa
for placement at top global technology firms, leading its Series B round.20
It also acquired Meta—a Canadian startup that developed artificial
intelligence technology to analyze and assimilate medical research data,
making it more usable by scientists.21 CZI plans to offer the research
community free and open access to Meta’s tools,22 and has announced a
$5.5 million grant to University of Massachusetts researchers to help
develop them.23
The Initiative is also developing its advocacy program. It tapped
David Plouffe, a former senior advisor to President Barack Obama, to
lead its policy and advocacy efforts in early 2017.24 Demonstrating
political savvy right out of the gate, Plouffe’s hiring was announced
alongside the appointment of Kenneth Mehlman, who managed President
17. See Katie Benner, Not Thinking Small for $3 Billion Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2016, at B6.
18. CHAN ZUCKERBERG BIOHUB, https://czbiohub.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
19. See id.
20. See Nathan McAlone, Mark Zuckerberg Just Made a Big Investment in a Startup That
Pays Young People in Africa to Learn Code, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/chan-zuckerberg-initiative-leads-24-million-round-in-andela2016-6.
21. See Liat Clark, Why the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative is Buying AI Search Tool Meta,
WIRED (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/chan-zuckerberg-initiative-buys-aiscientific-search-tool-meta.
22. See id.
23. See Katheleen Conti, UMass Gets Grant Funds from Chan Zuckerberg; Charity Will
Back AI Research Tool Project, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.boston.com/
news/education/2018/01/21/umass-is-getting-a-5-5-million-grant-from-the-chan-zuckerberginitiative.
24. See Mike Isaac, Chan Zuckerberg Initiative Builds Political Muscle for Philanthropic
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/technology/chanzuckerberg-initiative-builds-political-muscle-for-philanthropic-work.html.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/1

6

Reiser: Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability C

2018]

DISRUPTIVE PHILANTHROPY

927

George W. Bush’s 2004 re-election, to lead CZI’s policy advisory
board.25
These early efforts take advantage of the flexible structure CZI’s
founders adopted. As an LLC, it can make both grants to nonprofit
entities like a traditional foundation and equity investments and
acquisitions like a venture capital or private equity fund.26 Its policy
efforts have not been as transparent—discretion being another boon of
organization as an LLC—but they are unimpeded by the stringent
regulatory limits that would apply to a tax-exempt nonprofit.
A. Disruptive Philanthropy Pioneers
As deftly as CZI has employed disruptive philanthropy, it cannot
claim to have invented it. Other Silicon Valley philanthropists pioneered
the philanthropy LLC and for-profit philanthropy vehicles more
generally. They too have used these creative structures to achieve
operational flexibility, privacy, and control.
One of the earliest examples of the LLC structure is the Emerson
Collective, founded by Laurene Powell Jobs in 2004.27 Powell Jobs, the
widow of Apple founder Steve Jobs, has a reported net worth of nearly
$20 billion.28 She uses Emerson as a coordinated hub for her
grantmaking, investment activity (particularly investment in social
enterprises), and political action.29 Emerson funds a number of nonprofits
in the education space, including College Track, a nonprofit education
and mentoring organization Powell Jobs founded prior to Emerson’s
creation,30 and XQ: The Super School Project, a $50 million project

25. See id.
26. See About, CHAN ZUCKERBERG INITIATIVE, https://chanzuckerberg.com/about/ (last
visited June 6, 2018) (“We look for bold ideas — regardless of structure and stage — and help
them scale . . . . We make long-term investments because important breakthroughs often take
decades, or even centuries.”). Previously, the CZI website was even more explicit about this issue.
The prior version of the “About” page explained, “We invest in the best ideas regardless of
organizational structure. That includes nonprofit and for profit entities, as well as nongovernmental research institutions.” See Kate Bramson and Linda Borg, Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg visits Providence school, meets with governor, PROVIDENCE J. (May 22, 2017, 9:08
PM); Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg visits Del Sesto Middle School, ABC6 NEWS (Jun. 5,
2017, 5:39 PM) (quoting this language).
27. See Company Overview of The Emerson Collective LLC, BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=263956917.
28. See Laurene Powell Jobs & Family: Real Time Net Worth, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/profile/laurene-powell-jobs/.
29. See Our Mission, EMERSON COLLECTIVE, http://www.emersoncollective.com/about-us.
30. See Our History, C. TRACK, https://collegetrack.org/who-we-are/our-history/ (last
visited June 9, 2018) (describing its founding, by Ms. Powell Jobs and Carlos Watson, in the
1990s).
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initiated in 2015 to rethink public high schools.31 Emerson’s investments
have been eclectic, in recent years ranging from providing seed funding
to education and health technology startups; to leading a Series A round
for Neighborly, an online broker for municipal bonds;32 to buying a
majority stake in The Atlantic.33 Emerson also cites immigration reform
among its priorities,34 and can use advocacy and political contributions
to pursue it. The Emerson Collective’s long tenure and deep pockets
suggest these publicized efforts may only scratch the surface of its
activities. Ms. Powell Jobs is famously private,35 preferring anonymous
gifts and the retreat from the spotlight that Emerson’s LLC structure
facilitates.
In 1995, eBay founder Pierre Omidyar and his wife, Pam, began their
organized philanthropic efforts by creating a traditional nonprofit
foundation. In 2004, however, they established an LLC to broaden the
types of strategies they could use to achieve their philanthropic goals.36
Operating together and now known as The Omidyar Network, the
nonprofit private foundation continues to make grants primarily to
operating charities while the LLC arm makes impact investments
intended to drive social change.37 Both types of efforts stretch across a
range of issue areas, from education to financial inclusion.38 The Omidyar
Network has also become an advocate for the value of impact investing.
It warns that “[l]eaving the markets out of our efforts to tackle society’s
most intractable problems ignores a powerful force for identifying viable

31. See Who We Are, XQ, https://xqsuperschool.org/whoweare (last visited June 9, 2018)
(noting that Laurene Powell Jobs chairs the XQ board).
32. Jase Wilson, Neighborly Raised a Series A, NEIGHBORLY (May 16, 2017),
https://neighborly.com/learn/neighborly-raised-series.
33. See Gillian B. White, Emerson Collective Acquires Majority Stake in the Atlantic,
ATLANTIC (July 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/emersoncollective-atlantic-coalition/535215/.
34. See Immigration, EMERSON COLLECTIVE, http://www.emersoncollective.com/
immigration/.
35. See Peter Lattman & Claire Cain Miller, A Modest Billionaire Makes Her Way Onto the
Philanthropic Stage, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2013, at B1 (“Famous because of her last name and
fortune, she has always been private and publicity-averse.”).
36. See Why a Hybrid Structure?, OMIDYAR NETWORK (June 26, 2017),
https://www.omidyar.com/spotlight/why-hybrid-structure#content.
37. See id.
38. See Investees, OMIDYAR NETWORK, https://www.omidyar.com/investees; see also
Kevin Johnson, A Peek Inside Omidyar Network’s Methodology for Making Grants and
Investments, NONPROFIT Q. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/11/30/peekinside-omidyar-networks-methodology-making-grants-investments/ (describing, for example,
investments in insurance for the developing world).
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solutions that can scale to help millions.”39 Its tandem approach gives it
access to the best of both worlds—nonprofit and for-profit
philanthropy—and it tailors the capital it provides to the needs of
particular issues, organizations, and geographies.40
While not the project of an individual philanthropist, the creation of
Google.org in 2008 is another important antecedent. Google, Inc. had a
traditional corporate foundation,41 but it changed course when it
established an in-house division dedicated to philanthropy. Google.org
has evolved and shifted its approach over time, and now describes its
mission as “accelerat[ing] the progress of innovative nonprofits by
connecting them to the best of Google.”42 Initially, though, Google.org
had much in common with the philanthropy LLC structures of Emerson
and Omidyar. It made investments in for-profits alongside charitable
grants in its climate change, public health, and antipoverty areas of focus,
and its efforts all leveraged its deep technology expertise.43 Launching
these initiatives within a traditional nonprofit foundation would have
risked violating a number of tax regulations.44 In contrast, the for-profit
philanthropy strategy gave Google’s leaders operational flexibility, along
with valuable privacy and ultimate control.45
Corporate experimentation with for-profit philanthropy has even
spread beyond Silicon Valley. General Motors (GM) announced last year
that as part of “overhauling its $30-million-a-year philanthropy efforts to
focus on high-tech education, safety and economic sustainability,” it
would shutter its longstanding General Motors Foundation.46 Going
forward, GM’s philanthropy would be coordinated by its internal Global
Corporate Giving department and grants would be made directly by the
corporation.47 Like Google, GM made the move to enhance operational
flexibility and improve the coordination of its business and philanthropic
strategies.48
39. Impact Investing, OMIDYAR NETWORK, https://www.omidyar.com/our-work/impactinvesting.
40. See id.
41. Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at vi (Aug. 18, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312504073639/ds1.htm (noting the
establishment of the Google Foundation).
42. Our Work, GOOGLE.ORG, https://www.google.org/our-work/.
43. See Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2440–
42 (2009).
44. See id. at 2452–62.
45. Id.
46. Melissa Burden, GM to End Foundation, Redirect its Charitable Giving, DETROIT NEWS
(June 12, 2017), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/general-motors/2017/06/12/
gm-giving/102764328/.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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B. A Silicon Valley Development
The GM development aside, for-profit philanthropy is very much
associated with wealth generated by technology entrepreneurs in Silicon
Valley. It is no accident that CZI and its predecessor philanthropy LLCs
are all funded with tech wealth germinated there. Tech companies in
Silicon Valley are certainly not the first to seize the mantle of corporate
social responsibility. But they do make some of the boldest claims about
the power of their businesses to solve social problems. Just last summer,
Facebook announced a revision of its mission statement to “Give people
the power to build community and bring the world closer together.”49
Using for-profit structures for philanthropy aligns with this ethic of
blurring the boundary between generating profit and social good. Others
might find the premise of for-profit philanthropy oxymoronic, if not
unnerving. Entrepreneurs who view their behemoth for-profit businesses
as catalysts for saving the world are instead drawn to it.
The idea of using a for-profit entity to pursue social good also fits
seamlessly with the ethos of disruption that marks Silicon Valley culture.
Fortunes are not built in the Valley by building a better mousetrap, but
by reimagining an old industry or creating a new one from whole cloth.
Disruption is not just a catchword for those who find ultimate success
there. As David Callahan explains in his 2017 book on elite
philanthropists, this “disruptor” group’s ability to see how to disrupt an
industry is the key reason for their success and becomes an important part
of its members’ self-concepts.50 Along the way, the top echelons of
Silicon Valley billionaires develop a deep belief in the value of
experimentation, of skepticism, and even of failure.
When they turn to philanthropic pursuits, they take these values with
them. Using a typically for-profit structure to house a philanthropic
institution is just the kind of off-the-wall idea that is prized in Silicon
Valley: what they might call disruptive philanthropy. For a billionaire in
a hoodie out to “move fast and break things,”51 shaking up the fusty
private foundation “suits” is an attractive end in itself. If disruptive
philanthropy will also give a founder flexibility, avoid regulatory
complications, and enhance privacy—all without much foregone tax
benefit—so much the better.
49. About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about/; see also Josh
Constine, Facebook Changes Mission Statement to ‘Bring the World Closer Together,’ TECH
CRUNCH (June 22, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/22/bring-the-world-closer-together/
(describing the change).
50. See DAVID CALLAHAN, THE GIVERS: WEALTH, POWER, AND PHILANTHROPY IN A NEW
GILDED AGE 112–35 (2017).
51. Nick Statt, Zuckerberg: ‘Move Fast and Break Things’ Isn’t how Facebook Operates
Anymore, CNET (Apr. 30, 2017, 10:30 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/zuckerberg-move-fastand-break-things-isnt-how-we-operate-anymore/.
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II. BENEFITS OF THE TRADEOFF
Make no mistake: The LLC structure offers philanthropists very
significant benefits. First among these is flexibility—an LLC can make
grants to nonprofits, but it can also make investments in for-profits,
participate deeply in politics and advocacy, and work synergistically with
its employees, owners, and their other business interests. Its nimbleness
means a founder can establish an LLC as a one-stop shop capable of doing
everything she might want to achieve philanthropically within a single
entity. Alternatively, the LLC’s almost endlessly flexible nature also
allows it to serve as the coordinating vehicle for a philanthropic program
that includes a variety of strategies, some of which can be pursued
through other entities the LLC controls. The examples above show both
models already in use.
But operational flexibility is far from the LLC’s only advantage. An
LLC also affords its founders abundant privacy, especially as compared
to a tax-exempt nonprofit vehicle. For wealthy individuals keenly aware
that information is power, the ability to disclose selectively is valuable
indeed. Finally, an LLC structure empowers philanthropists who adopt it
with virtually absolute control. LLC law imposes few mandates, and
allows founders to design governance as they wish. They even hold the
ultimate power to exit. If their generosity or their fortunes wane,
philanthropy LLC founders can change their minds and reclaim their
assets.
A. Operational Flexibility
An LLC’s malleability would be a desirable feature all on its own, but
this advantage is enhanced by an LLC’s ability to engage in so many and
varied activities with very little regulation. In contrast, federal tax rules
and state organizational law impose myriad limits on a nonprofit
philanthropy’s investments and business relationships, harshly penalizing
those who exceed them. Moreover, to retain tax exemption and avoid
penalties, nonprofit philanthropic vehicles can engage in very limited
political activity—some none at all. As Part IV will discuss, the lack of
regulation of philanthropy LLCs does raise concerns for society. For their
philanthropist founders, though, it is indisputably a selling point.
Much of the comparative advantage of an LLC structure with respect
to regulation lies in avoiding the federal tax code’s strictures for “private
foundations,” a subcategory of § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations.
The statutory and regulatory tests for designation as a private foundation
are lengthy and complex.52 To summarize: A private foundation is (1) a
52. See JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 679–
704 (5th ed. 2015) (explaining the details of the tests over twenty-five densely packed pages); see
also I.R.C. §§ 170, 509 (2018) (the statutes from which the tests arise).
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nonprofit, § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization; (2) that is funded
predominantly by a single or small set of donors; and (3) that pursues its
mission primarily by enabling the efforts of other organizations rather
than running its own charitable programs.53
Individuals or families desiring to establish a tax-exempt
philanthropic vehicle of their own will almost always fall within this
definition, rather than qualifying as less regulated and more taxadvantaged “public charities.” The resulting organizations will therefore
be subject to the restrictive private foundation rules.54 The limitations
these rules impose span many topics, including investment practices,
political activity, and relationships between the foundation and its leaders
and donors. Had Chan and Zuckerberg formed a tax-exempt entity to
distribute their wealth, it would have been deemed a private foundation
and forced to contend with this army of restrictions.55 An LLC structure
neatly avoids them.
1. Investment Choices
Chan, Zuckerberg, and their precursors believe in the power of
business as a force for good. They see the value their technology
businesses have brought to society and believe many social problems can
be solved by entrepreneurs. To that end, they see investment in social
enterprises as an important component of their philanthropic programs.
They are not alone. In a 2016 survey of wealthy donors, thirty-three
percent of these high-net-worth individuals reported that they “participate
53. See FISHMAN ET AL., supra note 52, at 679–704 (5th ed. 2015); I.R.C. §§ 170,
509 (2018). An LLC can seek tax-exempt status, but only if its members are § 501(c)(3) exempt
organizations or governmental entities, a hurdle CZI and the other philanthropist-owned LLCs
discussed here could not clear. See Keatinge, supra note 16, at 574 (describing these and other
limitations).
54. Donors who establish a “donor-advised fund” account within a public charity, discussed
infra at notes 196–201 and accompanying text, can escape some of the private foundation
restrictions.
55. Chan and Zuckerberg do have a private foundation, but it is not the coordinating vehicle
for their philanthropic efforts. In 2016, the most recent year for which disclosures are available,
it was used to make charitable contributions funded by transfers from CZI. See Chan Zuckerberg
Foundation, Form 990-PF (2016), https://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2016/455/002/2016455002209-0e86d20b-F.pdf (showing the Foundation was the recipient of over $1 billion in
Facebook stock from the Initiative and granted approximately $21 million to two public charities);
see also supra notes 7–8 and 18–19 and accompanying text (describing the Primary School and
the Biohub project). Filings for prior years show minimal contributions and grants. See Chan
Zuckerberg Foundation Form 990-PF (2015), https://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2015/
455/002/2015-455002209-0d500d0b-F.pdf; Chan Zuckerberg Foundation Form 990-PF (2014);
https://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2014/455/002/2014-455002209-0c175ef6-F.pdf
(showing the Guidestar report of this form, in the name of The Openness Trust, as the 2014
disclosure of the Chan Zuckerberg Foundation).
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in impact investing.”56 Where an LLC offers philanthropists a wide berth
to engage in this kind of blended investment activity, private foundations
are subject to a raft of burdensome—sometimes even prohibitive—
regulatory restrictions.
Federal tax law most forcefully constrains private foundations’
investments by imposing serious, and potentially confiscatory, excise
taxes on foundations that hold too large a stake in any business
enterprise.57 The baseline rule allows foundations to hold up to twenty
percent of a corporation’s voting stock.58 This ceiling can vary in either
direction, depending on the circumstances. The permissible limit is
reduced by the holdings of the foundation’s leaders or substantial
contributors;59 it is increased to thirty-five percent if unrelated persons
have “effective control” of the corporation in which the foundation
invests.60 Private foundations that receive such excess business holdings
by gift or bequest need not disclaim the assets or sell them in an
immediate fire sale, but they must dispose of them within five years. 61 If
they do not, the excess holdings will be subject to a whopping 200% tax.62
This excess-business-holdings regime creates two different sorts of
problems for entrepreneurs turned philanthropists. First, it can impose a
timeline for relinquishing control over their companies. For those like
Pierre Omidyar, who no longer owns anything close to twenty percent of
eBay and stepped away from active control of the company years ago,
relinquishing control is a nonissue.63 But founders in the Zuckerberg
mold will fiercely resist divestiture. Zuckerberg is thirty-four years old
and has no intention of giving up control of Facebook’s voting stock or
daily business operations anytime soon.64 Yet much of his wealth is tied
up in the company.65 He would need to donate his controlling interest to
56. U.S. TR. & THE LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, THE 2016 U.S. TRUST STUDY OF
HIGH NET WORTH PHILANTHROPY: CHARITABLE PRACTICES AND PREFERENCES OF WEALTHY
HOUSEHOLDS 77, http://www.ustrust.com/publish/content/application/pdf/GWMOL/USTp_
ARMCGDN7_oct_2017.pdf.
57. I.R.C. § 4943(a)(1).
58. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(A).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 4943(c)(2)(B).
61. Id. § 4943(c)(6). Under certain circumstances, a private foundation may obtain an
additional five-year extension from the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 4943(c)(7).
62. Id. § 4943(b).
63. See Ed Lin, Pierre Omidyar Trims Stakes in eBay, PayPal, BARRON’S (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/pierre-omidyar-trims-stakes-in-ebay-paypal-1518632718.
64. See, e.g., Kathleen Chaykowski, How Facebook is Making Sure Zuckerberg Stays in
Control Forever, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/
2016/04/27/how-facebook-is-making-sure-zuckerberg-stays-in-control-forever/#2b4d3ac4e97c.
65. Lisa Marie Segarra, Mark Zuckerberg Just Became the World’s Fifth Richest Person,
MONEY (July 27, 2017), http://time.com/money/4877281/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-worlds-
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his philanthropy to make good on his ninety-nine percent pledge.66 If the
philanthropy was structured as a private foundation, in just a few years,
the excess business holdings rules would require the foundation to sell
this large stake in Facebook to investors over which Zuckerberg has no
sway.
Congress intended the rules to function this way—to combat concerns
“that some foundation managers were investing foundation assets in
enterprises in which their donors also had a personal interest and were
operating them in a manner that provided more benefit to the donors than
to the public.”67 Despite some strong criticism, the excess business
holdings rules remain on the books.68
This regime would understandably sour philanthropists like
Zuckerberg on private foundations.69 Zuckerberg is set on remaining in
control of Facebook.70 In fact, he was originally unwilling even to
transfer his voting control over Facebook to the Initiative he and his wife
fully control.71 (This is not so surprising considering that the LLC would
eventually need to divest its shares to fund its charitable, investment, and
political activities.) Soon after CZI’s founding, Zuckerberg proposed that
the Facebook board reorganize the company’s capital structure.72 The
richest-person/.
66. See Zuckerberg, supra note 1 (discussing the ninety-nine percent pledge).
67. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 276; see also Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering
Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59, 68–93 (2004) (comprehensively
reviewing and critiquing the rationales behind the excess business holdings rules).
68. Newman’s Own Foundation, a frequent critic of the excess-business-holdings regime,
narrowly failed to obtain an exemption from the excess- business-holdings regime for itself and
other foundations like it as part of the 2017 tax legislation. See Ana Radelat, Tax Bill Glitch
Endangers Future of Newman’s Own and Actor’s Foundation, CONN. MIRROR (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://ctmirror.org/2017/12/21/tax-bill-glitch-endangers-future-of-newmans-own-and-actorsfoundation/. It did not, however, have to wait long for another bite at the apple. This time was
more successful, and the February 2018 Bipartisan Budget Act contains an exemption to the rules
for foundations that: (1) own 100% of the business; (2) receive their holdings other than by
purchase; (3) operate independently from the business enterprise; and (4) donate all of their profits
to charity. See I.R.C. § 4943(g) (2018); see also Ana Radelat, Budget Deal has Plenty for
Connecticut, CONN. MIRROR (Feb. 9, 2018), https://ctmirror.org/2018/02/09/senate-stumbles-onway-to-vote-on-budget-bill-with-plenty-for-ct/ (explaining that the exemption allowed
Newman’s Own to avoid the 200% excess business holdings tax). The contributions planned by
donors addressed here, however, would not fit within this new exemption.
69. Richard Schmalbeck predicted just such discomfort among self-made multimillionaires
more than a decade ago. See Schmalbeck, supra note 67, at 105–06. He also expected such
individuals to search for private foundation alternatives, see id. at 105–08, but he did not anticipate
their use of philanthropy LLCs.
70. See Chaykowski, supra note 64.
71. See Erin Griffith, Mark Zuckerberg Controls Facebook and He Intends to Keep it That
Way, FORTUNE (Apr. 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/27/zuckerberg-facebook-control/.
72. See id.
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new structure would have allowed him to donate large numbers of
economically valuable but nonvoting shares to the Initiative while
maintaining voting control of the company.73
Here’s how it worked. Facebook already had dual-class stock, with
Class B shares owned by Zuckerberg and other executives enjoying a tento-one voting advantage over publicly-traded Class A shares.74 The plan,
which the board approved but delayed executing due to shareholder
litigation,75 would have issued a dividend of two shares of a new Class C
stock to each holder of either Class A or B shares. 76 The Class C shares
would have had the same economic rights as Class A and B shares, but
no voting rights.77 After the dividend, Zuckerberg would have been able
to donate his new Class C shares to CZI while maintaining control
through his super-voting Class B holdings.78 The LLC could sell those
Class C shares to institutional investors, mom and pop, or my Aunt
Mary—it still wouldn’t undermine Zuckerberg’s control of Facebook.
Not all entrepreneurs can use this particular dodge. Creating a dualclass structure midstream is difficult.79 Some philanthropists will not
helm companies that conveniently already have one in place—though the
number of companies adopting them is large and growing, particularly in
the tech field.80 Even philanthropists with a dual-class structure at their
73. See id.
74. See Kurt Wagner, How Can Zuckerberg Give Away All That Stock and Still Control
Facebook?, RECODE (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.recode.net/2015/12/14/11621416/how-canmark-zuckerberg-give-away-stock-and-while-still-controlling.
75. See Second Stipulation and Order Governing Case Schedule at 3, In re Facebook, Inc.
Class C Reclassification Litig., No. 122286-VCL (Del. Ch. Ct. Mar. 21, 2017) (“Facebook, Inc.
shall not effect the amendment of its certificate of incorporation and stock reclassification that is
the subject of this litigation during the pendency of proceedings in this Court.”). As explained
below, events overtook the case, and it never went to trial. See Stipulation and Order Dismissing
Action as Moot and Retaining Jurisdiction to Determine Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Application for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 4, In re Facebook, Inc. Class C
Reclassification Litig., No. 122286-VCL (Del. Ch. Ct. Sept. 26, 2017) [hereinafter Order
Dismissing Action].
76. See Colin Stretch, Preserving Founder-Led Structure to Focus on the Long Term,
FACEBOOK (Apr. 27, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/04/q1-earnings-note/
(announcing the plan to shareholders).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. For example, while companies newly going public can adopt a dual-class structure, the
NYSE restricts its listed companies from undertaking a midstream reclassification to create a dualclass structure. See NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 313.00(A), 313.10 (2018),
http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_4&manual=%2F
lcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F.
80. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 594 (2017) (“[T]here has been an upward trend in the adoption of
dual-class stock since Google went public with a dual-class structure in 2004 and was followed
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disposal may be unable convince their boards to adopt a plan like
Zuckerberg’s. It also remains to be seen if courts will balk at such moves,
and the challenge to Facebook’s plan will not provide any answers. On
the eve of trial in late September 2017, with his company under fire due
to the Russian election meddling scandal, Zuckerberg asked the Facebook
board to abandon it.81 It complied, and the court dismissed the case as
moot.82
However the corporate law question is resolved, the nonvoting share
gambit will not evade the excess-business-holdings regime. Section 4943
treats nonvoting shares held by a private foundation as permitted holdings
only so long its leaders and substantial contributors own no more than
twenty percent of the voting stock.83 Zuckerberg and CZI could not have
taken refuge in this safe harbor. The plan to develop and donate Class C
shares was intended specifically to ensure Zuckerberg would remain in
control of far more than twenty percent of Facebook’s voting shares. Had
he created a private foundation, the excess business holdings rules would
have required it to divest on the government’s timeline or turn over
billions to the federal treasury.
The excess-business-holdings regime also creates a second problem:
impeding particular investment strategies. Consider Powell Jobs’
Emerson Initiative. Venture-capital-like investment is a major part of its
activities, participating in over a dozen rounds of funding for social
enterprise startups over the last five years—often as the lead investor.84
Emerson has also invested in more established firms that it believes will
make an impact in its areas of interest. For example, in 2016 it acquired
“a significant minority stake in Anonymous Content, the production and
management company behind the Oscar-winning film Spotlight” to
harness “the power of storytelling to shape our culture and improve
lives.”85 Last year it bought majority control in The Atlantic.86 The
by well-known tech companies, such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn, Snap, Trip Advisor, and
Zynga.”).
81. See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/search/
top/?q=mark%20zuckerberg%20stock%20reclassification&filters_rp_author=%7B%22name%2
2%3A%22author%22%2C%22args%22%3A%224%22%7D (“I've asked our board to withdraw
the proposal to reclassify our stock – and the board has agreed.”).
82. See Order Dismissing Action, supra note 75.
83. See I.R.C. § 4943 (2018); Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(b)(2) (1977).
84. See Emerson Collective: Investments, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/
organization/emerson-collective/investments/investments_list#section-investments (last visited
June 9, 2018).
85. Matthew Belloni, Laurene Powell Jobs Goes Hollywood, Buys Minority Stake in
“Spotlight” Producer Anonymous Content, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 30, 2016, 7:37 AM),
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/laurene-powell-jobs-takes-minority-934139.
86. See White, supra note 33.
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precise stakes involved in these deals are often undisclosed, but when
Emerson acts as lead investor, stakes over the excess business holdings
limits will not be unusual.87 As an LLC, though, Emerson need not
concern itself with these restrictions.
A philanthropy LLC means no regulatory regime will set the schedule
for disposing of a founder’s stock in his or her company.88 Owners can
contribute whatever assets they wish to their philanthropic ventures, and
they may impose any time horizon they choose for divestiture. They can
likewise opt to purchase positions of any size they desire in the investee
companies they select. They can structure their investments based on the
business and impact value of each deal, with no externally imposed
regulatory ceilings. They sit, happily and unimpeded by regulation, in the
driver’s seat.
But the headaches for private foundations seeking flexibility for their
investment operations do not end with the excess business holdings rules.
State law duties of care and prudence require their charitable fiduciaries
to make investment decisions as would a prudent person, and often prize
diversification.89 Section 4944 of the federal tax code doubles down on
this idea. “If a private foundation invests any amount in such a manner as
to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes,” excise taxes
apply to both the entity and its management.90 Treasury regulations
impose a standard of ordinary business care and prudence to avoid these
penalties, which is applied investment-by-investment, as of the time the
investment was made, and in relation to the foundation’s complete
investment portfolio.91 These standards, and their heavy reliance on
diversification, create serious risks for philanthropists planning to
allocate much or all of their portfolios to impact investments—which can
carry high risk, generate below-market financial return, or both.
A number of factors considerably reduce these apparent hazards. The
first is a statutory exception: “[I]nvestments, the primary purpose of
which is to accomplish one or more [charitable purposes], and no
significant purpose of which is the production of income or the
appreciation of property, shall not be considered as investments which
87. Investments that qualify as program-related under I.R.C. § 4944, discussed infra notes
92-96 and accompanying text, can escape the excess business holdings rules. As noted there,
however, such investments must lack a financial motive and many investments philanthropy LLC
adopters would like to make will not so qualify.
88. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(1) (1972) (stating the general requirements for discharge
of excess business holdings, which apply only to private foundations and donor-advised funds).
89. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 189–95, 211–15.
90. I.R.C. § 4944 (b)(2) (2018) (imposing penalties ranging from five to twenty-five percent
of the amount of the jeopardizing investment).
91. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2).
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jeopardize the carrying out of exempt purposes.”92 Falling within this
program-related investment (PRI) exception not only eliminates potential
excise tax liability under Section 4944, but also allows a private
foundation to count the excepted investment towards its required annual
payout of five percent of its assets.93 Second, the addition of new
regulatory examples in 2016, specifically blessed nineteen different types
of transactions as qualifying PRIs.94 These examples clarify that PRIs
may be made to for-profit entities, that they may be structured as debt or
equity investments, and that a potentially high rate of return is not a
disqualifier.95 The revised regulations also reinforce the requirement that
all PRIs must be made with a primary purpose of accomplishing a
charitable purpose, and frequently cite qualifying investments’ lack of
appeal to other investors.96
Today’s PRI regulations offer comfort to private foundations
considering certain types of impact investments. Yet the requirements
that PRIs serve a primarily charitable purpose, not have a significant
purpose to generate income, and not be investments a commercial
investor would undertake remain stumbling blocks. It would be hard to
defend an investment like Emerson’s in Anonymous Content as primarily
charitable and without a financial motivation. The round of Neighborly
Series A that it led was joined by social investors and pure venture capital
funds.97 The PRI exception will not so easily accommodate investments
like these.
Of course, if an investment will not qualify as a PRI because it is too
lucrative, the jeopardy investment regime may not present a problem. But
impact investing for blended value can have a partially financial
motivation that would disqualify it as a PRI while still presenting a risk
profile or lack of diversification that could render it jeopardizing under
§ 4944. The IRS provided reassuring guidance in 2015, stating:
When exercising ordinary business care and prudence in
deciding whether to make an investment, foundation
managers may consider all relevant facts and circumstances,
92. I.R.C. § 4944(c). Another statutory exception, which exempts donated investments
from the diversification rules, would shield donated stock (but not investments chosen as part of
a foundation’s own investment program) from scrutiny under Section 4944. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4944-1(a)(2)(ii)(a).
93. The foundation payout requirement is discussed in more detail infra notes 103–05 and
accompanying text.
94. See Treas. Reg. § 54.4944-3(b).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Jase Wilson, Neighborly Raised a Series A, NEIGHBORLY (May 16, 2017),
https://learn.neighborly.com/news/neighborly-raised-series/.
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including the relationship between a particular investment
and the foundation’s charitable purposes. Foundation
managers are not required to select only investments that
offer the highest rates of return, the lowest risks, or the
greatest liquidity so long as the foundation managers
exercise the requisite ordinary business care and prudence
under the facts and circumstances prevailing at the time of
the investment in making investment decisions that support,
and do not jeopardize, the furtherance of the private
foundation’s charitable purposes.98
Language in the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act
permitting fiduciaries making investment decisions to “consider the
charitable purposes of the institution” in making their selections suggests
the trend under state law will be similar.99
Private foundations are increasingly making impact investments a part
of their endowment strategy. In one of the biggest commitments to date,
the Ford Foundation announced last year it would devote up to one billion
of its twelve-billion-dollar endowment to mission-related investments
over the next ten years.100 In doing so, it explicitly credited the 2015 IRS
guidance in resolving the “legal uncertainty” that had until its issue been
a “barrier” to adopting such an approach.101 The Nathan Cummings
Foundation has only about half a billion in endowment, but pledged in
2018 that it would align all of its investments with its mission.102 These
important developments should eliminate private foundation concerns
that investing that trades financial for social returns will per se violate
federal tax law or state fiduciary obligations.
The philanthropy LLC still affords its creators far greater flexibility
and comfort. This model frees philanthropists to pursue whatever type
and range of investments they wish. A philanthropy LLC can act like a
venture capital fund, a private equity firm, or free-wheeling speculator.
Moreover, it can do so with neither the anxiety nor the burden of proving
these investments fit the PRI model or any other legal standard.
98. I.R.S. Notice 15-62, IRB 2015-39 (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n15-62.pdf.
99. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(a), (e)(1)(H) (Nat’l
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 2006).
100. Darren Walker, Unleashing the Power of Endowments: The Next Great Challenge for
Philanthropy, FORD FOUND.: EQUALS CHANGE BLOG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.ford
foundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/unleashing-the-power-of-endowments-the-nextgreat-challenge-for-philanthropy/.
101. Id.
102. See Nathan Cummings Foundation, Nathan Cummings Foundation Announces Move to
100 Percent Mission-Aligned Investing, http://www.nathancummings.org/ncf-commits-100percent.
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Finally, using a philanthropy LLC structure gives a donor more
freedom to determine how quickly her philanthropy will spend its assets.
Tax rules require private foundations to distribute five percent of their
assets annually to qualifying recipients (generally tax-exempt public
charities),103 in an effort to prevent donors from using them to warehouse
assets tax-free.104 Foundations who fail to meet this minimum
distribution requirement again are subject to penalty taxes.105 Like the
excess business holding rules, jeopardy investment prohibition, and
nonprofit fiduciary law, these demands simply do not apply to a
philanthropy LLC. Their founders are masters not only of how their
philanthropies invest their assets, but of how and when they spend them.
2. Political Activity
The philanthropy LLC will also outperform the private foundation for
philanthropists who see political action as pivotal to achieving their goals.
Federal law106 checks the political activities of all tax-exempt charitable
entities, and it most severely limits private foundations.107 Private
foundations risk loss of exemption if they engage in substantial lobbying
or any political campaign activity, and such activities also subject the
foundation and its management to two-tiered penalty taxes.108 A twenty
percent tax will be levied on any private foundation expenditures on
lobbying or campaign activity,109 and willful and unreasonable
expenditures expose foundation managers to an additional five percent
tax.110 If the amount expended on prohibited activities is not returned to
the foundation, further penalties of 100% for the foundation and fifty
percent for foundation managers apply.111 Even voter registration drives
103. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2018).
104. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 272.
105. See I.R.C. § 4942 (a)–(b) (imposing first tier taxes of 30% of the undistributed amounts
and second tier taxes of 100%).
106. State nonprofit corporation and charitable trust law rarely include explicit prohibitions
on political activity, though such activity can preclude state property tax exemption. See Dana
Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 28 (2011). As the
sweeping prohibitions under federal tax law eclipse any state law in this area, the remainder of
the Article will leave aside state law constraints on political activity.
107. Private foundations are not the only exempt category available to structure a
philanthropic vehicle, but as noted earlier, they are the most likely classification of a § 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt philanthropic vehicle formed by the donors considered here.
108. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (“[N]o part of the net earnings of” a tax-exempt charitable entity
may be used to “participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.”); see also id. § 4945(d) (subjecting any lobbying
or campaign expenditure by a private foundation to prohibitive penalty taxes).
109. Id. § 4945(a), (d), (e).
110. Id. § 4945(a)(2).
111. Id. § 4945(b).
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will trigger these hefty penalties, unless they are carefully constructed to
avoid the appearance of partisanship.112 While foundation donors can
conduct political activities on their own or through other entities they
control, the foundation itself must stay far clear of them.
These political restrictions would clearly frustrate donors like Powell
Jobs, Chan, and Zuckerberg. The Emerson Collective touts its dedication
to immigration and education reform.113 Powell Jobs even met personally
with President Trump to advocate that immigration reform be done in a
“thoughtful way.”114 From its inception, the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative
has emphasized the importance of advocacy work to its objectives. Chan
and Zuckerberg’s letter to Max articulated that “[w]e must participate in
policy and advocacy to shape debates. Many institutions are unwilling to
do this, but progress must be supported by movements to be
sustainable.”115 It would be impossible to meet commitments like these
using a tax-exempt private foundation alone, and running multiple
organizations adds risk and expense.
Of course, tax-exempt organizations other than private foundations
can accommodate a substantial amount of political activity,116 and
politically oriented donors frequently use them for such purposes. Both
social welfare organizations exempt under § 501(c)(4) and business
leagues exempt under § 501(c)(6) can engage in unlimited lobbying, so
long as it is relevant to their exempt purposes.117 These organizations can

112. Id. § 4945(d)(2), (f).
113. See Priorities, EMERSON COLLECTIVE, http://www.emersoncollective.com/about-us.
114. See Tony Romm, Laurene Powell Jobs and Senator Kamala Harris Are Worried About
Trump and Immigration, RECODE (June 1, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/6/1/15694146/
laurene-powell-jobs-kamala-harris-california-senator-donald-trump-dreamers-code-2017.
115. Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
116. The baseline political restrictions allowing only insubstantial lobbying and no political
campaign activity appear in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and apply only to private foundations and public
charities organized under this section.
117. Treas. Reg. § 501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (providing that an organization
“may qualify [for exemption] under section 501(c)(4) even though it is an action organization,”
meaning it engages in lobbying); Rev. Rul. 61-177, 1961-2 C.B. 117 (stating that an organization
may be exempt under section 501(c)(6) “even though its sole activity is directed to the influencing
of legislation which is germane to such common business interest”). For comprehensive treatment
of the tax consequences of political activity by social welfare organizations and business leagues,
see JOHN FRANCIS REILLY & BARBARA A. BRAIG ALLEN, IRS, POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AND
LOBBYING ACTIVITIES OF IRC 501(C)(4), (C)(5), AND (C)(6) ORGANIZATIONS (2003),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf. For a discussion of the 501(c)(4) scandal that
embroiled the IRS in 2013, see Evelyn Brody & Marcus Owens, Exile to Main Street: The I.R.S.’s
Diminished Role in Overseeing Tax-Exempt Organizations, 91 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 859 (2016).
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also engage in political campaign activity so long as it does not become
“primary.”118
But donors like Powell Jobs, Chan, and Zuckerberg would have little
to gain from structuring their entities as social welfare organizations or
business leagues. Social welfare entities are not eligible to receive taxdeductible contributions. Contributions to business leagues are
deductible only if they qualify as business expenses, which donations for
lobbying or political campaign activity do not.119 These organizations can
engage in political activity without imperiling their tax-exempt status, but
doing so can reduce the value of the exemption. Both are taxed on the
lesser of their political expenditures or their investment income.120 For
founders who plan for their organization to conduct both social welfare
or business league and political activities (carefully preventing political
ones from becoming primary) and to have little or no investment income,
this reduction in value will be small. For donors like those contemplated
here, who will expect significant investment income to maintain their
philanthropic venture’s real assets, the reduction is potentially
substantial. These alternatives are useful structures for many types of
political organizations, but they are not well-suited for donors seeking an
organization devoted to combining charitable, investment, and significant
political pursuits.121
Where exempt entities run into walls, LLCs open doors. A
philanthropy LLC can do as much lobbying and political campaign
activity its owners desire, so long as it complies with any relevant
disclosure and campaign finance regulations. After Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,122 even these limitations have been
reduced. The LLC model is an elegant solution for donors who see
political action as intertwined with their social goals. Combining this
political capacity with the versatility to conduct and coordinate both
charitable grants and impact investments further enhances the operational
flexibility of the philanthropy LLC.

118. See Rev. Rul. 81-95 (addressing 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969) (addressing 501(c)(6) business leagues).
119. Tax treatment of donations – 501(c)(6) organizations, I.R.S., https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/other-non-profits/tax-treatment-of-donations-501c6-organizations (last
updated Apr. 2, 2018).
120. See I.R.C. § 527(f) (2018).
121. For a discussion considering a range of such structures, as well as donor-advised funds
and supporting organizations, see Dana Brakman Reiser, Sharon Lincoln & Ingrid Mittermeier,
Using Non-501(c)(3) Vehicles to Accomplish Philanthropic Objectives, 95 TAXES: TAX MAG. 41
(2017).
122. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss5/1

22

Reiser: Disruptive Philanthropy: Chan-Zuckerberg, the Limited Liability C

2018]

DISRUPTIVE PHILANTHROPY

943

3. Coordination Across Entities
Nonprofit structures not only limit investment choices and political
activity, but also regulate the relationships a philanthropic venture may
have with its fiduciaries, its donors, and other entities either of them
controls. Some of these restrictions derive from state law, others result
from the private foundation rules of the federal tax code.
Nonprofit fiduciary concepts drawn from state nonprofit corporate
and charitable trust law—here the duty of loyalty rather than that of care
or prudence—limit compensation and other self-dealing transactions.123
A private foundation organized as a charitable trust must avoid being
ensnared by trust law’s strict prohibitions on self-interested
transactions.124 By contrast, an incorporated private foundation can
generally prevent fiduciary liability by ensuring its compensation and
other self-dealing transactions are fair, but independent review and
documentation is advisable.125 Besting both, an LLC structure imposes
hardly any limits on compensation or sharing of resources. Delaware
LLCs can even waive fiduciary obligations.126
Federal tax law is stricter, especially so for private foundations.
Allowing a foundation’s net earnings to inure to its insiders or bestowing
a substantial private benefit on a third party risks loss of exemption.127
The private foundation excise taxes go even further. For example, they
characterize any “sale or exchange, or leasing, of property” between a
foundation and its directors, officers, substantial contributors, or entities
they control as self-dealing.128 The self-dealing label, and its associated
penalties, sticks even to transactions in which the foundation receives a
fair-market deal–or better.129 Like in the other private foundation excise
123. See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate Directors—
Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1861–62 (2012).
124. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 195–97 (describing these prohibitions and the
limited extent to which they can be eased).
125. See id. at 215–25 (explaining the common law and statutory approaches to fair dealing
in nonprofit corporations).
126. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2018) (“To the extent that, at law or in
equity, a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited
liability company . . . , [these] duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions
in the limited liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability company agreement
may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). LLC laws in
other jurisdictions are not always as accommodating as Delaware law, but still generally offer
more flexibility than charitable forms. Ellen Aprill, Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, Single
Member Limited Liability Companies, and Fiduciary Duties, 52 REAL PROPERTY, TRUST &
ESTATE L. J. 153, 161–81 (2017) (comparing LLC fiduciary law and fiduciary obligations in
charitable entities).
127. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
128. See id. § 4941(d)(1)(A).
129. See id.
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tax regimes described above, these penalties charge foundations and their
managers, and the transactions must be unwound to avoid second-order
confiscatory taxes.130 Only deals in which a foundation receives property
or services free of charge are safe.131
These rules will obviously hamper collaboration between a private
foundation and its donor’s business ventures. The original plans for
Google.org effectively demonstrate this lack of fit. The company saw
great value in using its technology and personnel to achieve philanthropic
goals. It announced it would use Google tools to track data from its
demonstration fleet of rechargeable cars and to provide real-time disease
warnings as part of its public health initiative.132 It also created a group
within its engineering division to research renewable energy. 133 But
selling or leasing these resources to its private foundation for as little as
one dollar would trigger self-dealing penalty taxes. Even sharing office
space would be fraught. Perhaps Google might have been willing to
provide all of these assets to its foundation gratis. Still, the deep
connections between the company’s business and its foundation could
risk exemption on grounds of private inurement or private benefit. Like
establishing Google.org as an internal division of the for-profit Google,
Inc., a philanthropy LLC avoids all of these concerns.
Compensation, too, becomes simpler. Since the philanthropies
explored here have taken the LLC route, the details of their compensation
arrangements are not publicly available. We do know, though, that CZI
plucked its early leadership from the highest levels of business, academia,
and government. Plouffe, who left Uber to lead CZI’s policy efforts,134 is
not the only example. CZI’s Chief Technology Officer came from
Amazon, the president of its science organization hails from Rockefeller
University, and the president of its education organization was a former
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Education.135 Perhaps some or all of these
individuals were persuaded to join the Initiative by its grand and
disruptive mission. Their talent and experience, however, would give
them access to many lucrative opportunities, and some (if not all) surely
had significant compensation requirements.
Even without knowing the particulars of their compensation, the
comparatively higher administrative hurdles a nonprofit vehicle would
have to clear to hire them are evident. State fiduciary law permits only

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See id. § 4941(a)–(b).
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4941(d)–2(b)(2), 53.4941(d)–2(d)(3).
See Brakman Reiser, supra note 43, at 2443.
See id.
See Isaac, supra note 24.
See CHAN ZUCKERBERG INITIATIVE, supra note 26.
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reasonable compensation of a nonprofit director, trustee, or officer.136
The private foundation rules align to this standard, permitting
compensation for fiduciaries, substantial contributors, and their related
persons and entities only when it is “reasonable and necessary to carrying
out the exempt purpose of the private foundation” and “not excessive.”137
Foundations can most easily prove compensation fits within these limits
through careful consideration of comparability data and
documentation.138 The 2017 tax legislation also adds a new twenty-one
percent excise tax on compensation over $1 million paid by tax-exempt
organizations.139
Had CZI been structured as a tax-exempt foundation, its top-flight
hires would be subject to these restrictive compensation regimes. At the
very least, to devise reasonable and nonexcessive compensation for them,
a foundation’s board would need to obtain and examine comparability
data and thoroughly document their decisions. In doing so, they would
need to consider whether any salaries over the $1 million level would be
worth triggering the excise tax. Once this process is complete, the
foundation would also need to disclose the compensation it awards to its
officers—as well as that paid to nonofficers among its five most highly
compensated employees—to the IRS and to the public.140 The
philanthropy LLC frees Chan and Zuckerberg from all these regulatory
burdens and many prying eyes.
B. Privacy
Nonprofit philanthropic institutions must operate with a considerable
amount of transparency. Private foundations and other tax-exempt
entities must submit annual informational returns to the IRS, on its
various Forms 990.141 These informational returns detail the
organization’s operations and governance, including spending and the

136. See JACK B. SIEGEL, A DESKTOP GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, AND
ADVISORS: AVOIDING TROUBLE WHILE DOING GOOD § 4.4(a) (2006).
137. I.R.C. § 4941(d)(2)(E) (2018).
138. See id.
139. See id. § 4960(c)(2)(a) (applying the tax only to such compensation to an entity’s five
highest compensated employees).
140. See I.R.S., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 900-PF 27 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i990pf.pdf (describing the requirements for listing “Information About Officers, Directors,
Trustees, Foundation Managers, Highly Paid Employees, and Contractors” on private
foundations’ annual disclosures).
141. See Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations File, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charitiesnon-profits/form-990-series-which-forms-do-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in (last
updated Aug. 4, 2017).
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names of various fiduciaries and employees.142 This and most of the other
content of the Form 990 is available to the public. Some of the most
sensitive information of all, the names and addresses of contributors, is
kept confidential by the IRS—except in the case of private foundations
and political organizations. Their donor lists are open to public
inspection.143 States also often require registration and annual reporting
by charitable entities operating within their borders, though many allow
organizations to file federal Forms 990 with in lieu of state-specific
forms.144 Disclosure requirements impose administrative costs, but more
importantly, transparency intrudes on donors’ privacy.
In stark contrast, for-profit philanthropic vehicles are screened from
public scrutiny. If founders opt for a philanthropy LLC, the entity may
not file any return whatsoever. The member of a single member LLC
must simply report income from it on her own (confidential) return.145
LLCs consisting of multiple members will file partnership returns,146 but
founders can again rely on tax confidentiality to protect the contents of
these filings. For donors like the famously private Powell Jobs, as well as
those who seek to shield some or all of their philanthropic activities from
public scrutiny, the privacy benefits an LLC structure provides may
outstrip any of its disadvantages.
C. Control
The final, powerful pull toward for-profit philanthropy is control. A
philanthropy LLC or other for-profit structure will give donors something
no nonprofit organizational form can offer—the ability to exit. The funds
the Omidyars contribute to their charitable nonprofit are locked into the
charitable stream.147 Even if they decide there is a better use for those

142. See, e.g., I.R.S., FORM 990: RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 7
(2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf; I.R.S., FORM 990-PF: RETURN OF PRIVATE
FOUNDATION 6 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990pf.pdf.
143. See I.R.S., SCHEDULE B: SCHEDULE OF CONTRIBUTORS 5 (2017),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990ezb.pdf. In July 2018, the IRS announced it would no longer
require many non-charitable types of tax-exempt entities to provide it with information about their
donors, but private foundations remain subject to donor disclosure to both regulators and the
public. See Rev. Proc. 2018-38, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-18-38.pdf.
144. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 315–17.
145. See I.R.S., PUBLICATION 3402: TAXATION OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 2 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3402.pdf.
146. See id.
147. This lock-in, sometimes called the “nondistribution constraint” is the defining
characteristic of nonprofit organizations. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 501 (1981) (coining the term).
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funds, the gift is irrevocable and both state organizational law and federal
tax law bars returning those funds to the donors’ private use.148
Not so their LLC. To be clear, the Omidyars—and other philanthropy
LLC adopters—have made no suggestion they ever plan to seek the return
of their donated assets. All of their public statements depict the transfers
to their LLCs as permanent and immutable, and they have given us no
reason to doubt their intentions. Still, there is no legal constraint forcing
their hands. LLC structures allow donors to change their minds and take
back their toys.
The control advantages of for-profit philanthropy also extend beyond
the ability to exit. Governance arrangements are more flexible in a forprofit, particularly in an LLC structure where a founder can be the sole
member and wield complete control over the entity’s affairs and assets.
A nonprofit can be structured to maximize founder control using a
charitable trust form with the founder as its sole trustee.149 This sole
trustee will remain subject to fiduciary standards, however, and charitable
fiduciary standards are more rigorous than those applicable to LLCs.150
As noted above, in some states LLC founders are even empowered to
waive fiduciary obligations if they so choose.151 Donors keen to
maximize their control over the philanthropic vehicles they create could
not do better than an LLC.
***
Perhaps counterintuitively, for-profit vehicles offer very attractive
benefits to aspiring philanthropists. Many of these advantages arise by
avoiding the multiple legal restrictions imposed on tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations, particularly on private foundations. Without these
limitations, a philanthropy LLC can choose among unfettered investment
options, engage deeply in politics, and structure its operations to take
148. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018) (defining tax-exempt charitable entities as those in
which “no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual”); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 13.01–.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008)
(prohibiting distributions in a popular uniform statute).
149. Although most jurisdictions, (and best practice) require multiple directors of a nonprofit
corporation, single-trustee charitable trusts are widely permissible. See Evelyn Brody, Charity
Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641, 645 (2005) (noting
this disparity). The IRS also appears to disfavor tax-exemption for entities with few directors,
although it does not have any specific authority to require particular governance practices for
exempt entities. See Terri Lynn Helge, Rejecting Charity: Why the IRS Denies Tax Exemption to
501(C)(3) Applicants, 14 PITT. TAX. REV. 1, 52–56 (2016) (reporting a study showing denials of
exemption frequently cite a small number of directors as a concern).
150. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 13, at 187–88 (describing the fiduciary standards for
charitable trustees and noting, their “strict” interpretation by courts).
151. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e) (2018).
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advantage of shared resources. It also can help donors safeguard their
privacy and avoid public scrutiny, all while maintaining unparalleled
control. These valuable benefits, however, do not come without costs—
either for individual donors or for society. The next Part will address the
tax burdens a donor must bear when organizing a philanthropic endeavor
as an LLC. After fully exploring the tradeoffs for donors, Part IV will
consider the likelihood that these disruptive philanthropy structures will
become more common, and examine the costs of this trend for the
philanthropic sector and society at large.
III. THE (LIMITED) DOWNSIDE
To obtain the philanthropy LLC’s benefits of flexibility, privacy, and
control, one might think donors must be willing to accept a very
significant downside: higher taxes. Shouldn’t eschewing nonprofit, taxexempt alternatives also mean leaving behind the substantial income, gift,
and estate tax benefits that come with them? If so, the sacrifice inherent
in a philanthropy LLC structure might well prove too great for many to
adopt. It turns out, however, that the real tax cost of adopting this
disruptive philanthropy structure is surprisingly limited.
A. Income Tax Advantages
Nonprofit, tax-exempt philanthropies receive two distinct types of
income tax advantages. The first is self-evident: The income these entities
generate is largely, if not entirely, invulnerable to taxation.152 Public
charities receive the most extensive tax-exemption; only their unrelated
business income is subject to taxation.153 Even when tax exemption is not
absolute, exempt entities pay tax on small slices or segments of their
income compared with taxable alternatives.154
The second type of advantage accrues not to tax-exempt entities
themselves, but to their donors. Qualifying charitable donations can
reduce a taxpayer’s overall income tax bill. This effect proceeds most
directly through the charitable contribution deduction. In just the same
fashion as other deductions, an itemizing taxpayer may subtract her
charitable contributions from her adjusted gross income in determining
her taxable income.155 By reducing the income figure to which the
152. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (describing various types of tax-exempt entities).
153. See id. § 501(c)(3) (setting forth income tax exemption for charitable entities); id. § 511
(imposing tax on unrelated business income of charitable organizations).
154. See, e.g., id. § 4940 (imposing a two percent excise tax on private foundations’ net
investment income); id. § 527(f) (imposing tax on the lesser of social welfare organization’s
political campaign expenditures or investment income).
155. See id. § 170(b). As many discussions of the 2017 tax legislation addressed, the benefits
of the charitable contribution deduction are only available to taxpayers who itemize. See Megan
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taxpayer’s tax rate is applied, charitable deductions decrease the total
amount of tax to be paid. Also, like any tax benefit structured as a
deduction, the deduction for charitable contributions increases in value
with the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer.156 The higher one’s income,
the more tax will be avoided for a contribution of the same amount.
Charitable contributors of appreciated property receive an additional
benefit. Typically, when a taxpayer owns appreciated property and sells
it, realizing a return, she must pay tax on the appreciation over her tax
basis in the asset.157 Yet donors of appreciated property to qualifying
charitable recipients need not recognize, and pay tax upon, their capital
gains.158 Neither will the recipient.159 The charity can sell the appreciated
asset for a profit, and its tax-exempt status will protect the return on this
transaction from taxation.
A philanthropy LLC itself qualifies for neither tax-exemption nor
deductibility.160 Consider CZI. If the Institute earns income on its
investments in Andela or Meta and that income is passed through to CZI’s
owners, Zuckerberg, and Chan, it will be taxable to them.161 Likewise,
O’Neil & Dan Parks, Tax Law Eliminates Giving Incentive for 21 Million Americans, Study Says,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Tax-Law-WipesOut-Giving/242227. For those who take the standard deduction instead—a group which is
expected to expand significantly when the standard deduction nearly doubles in 2018—the tax
code’s incentive for charitable contributions are irrelevant. See id. This impact has many in the
charitable sector worried, as some researchers have estimated the increased standard deduction
will lead to a significant drop in charitable giving. See id.
156. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 309, 345 (1972) (explaining this “unusual” facet of the charitable contribution deduction).
157. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
158. Id. § 170(e). The Trump administration’s plan to allow taxpayers to increase their basis
for inflation when calculating capital gains to be taxed would reduce, but not eliminate this
benefit. See Alex Daniels, Nonprofits Fear Impact of Trump Administration Plan to Cut CapitalGains Tax, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Aug. 2, 2017).
159. Id.
160. See id. §§ 170(c), 501(c).
161. Although philanthropy LLC owners like Chan and Zuckerberg may benefit from the
reduced tax rates on their individual incomes that apply starting in 2018, they are unlikely to
qualify for the new twenty-percent deduction on pass-through income. See I.R.C. § 199A. The
shape of this provision is quite murky as yet, but philanthropy LLC owners will have at least two
strikes against them in attempting to claim it. See Ken Berry, 2018 Tax Reform: Pass-Through
Income Deduction More Complex Than Thought, CPA PRAC. ADVISOR (Jan. 8, 2018),
http://www.cpapracticeadvisor.com/news/12389903/2018-tax-reform-pass-through-incomededuction-more-complex-than-thought. First, the business of a philanthropy LLC may well be
deemed a “specified service business”; eligibility for the deduction based on income from these
businesses phases out entirely at $415,000 for joint filers. See id. (explaining that above this
threshold, “you get no deduction—period”). Second, even if income falls below this rate, the
deduction is further limited for high earners based on the size of the company’s payrolls or its
depreciable business property—neither of which may be large for a philanthropy LLC with a
small staff and no depreciable assets. See id. (providing the details on these restrictions). More
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when the couple donates funds or assets to CZI, they will not be able to
take a deduction for this contribution in computing their annual income
taxes.
These sacrifices are not as great at it might first appear, however. On
the tax-exemption side, it is important to remember that exemption is only
of value to the extent that there is income to tax. CZI and its owners do
not purport to have income-generating goals. Quite the opposite. They
plan to make often risky impact investments and give money away to
charities and political causes. If the losses CZI generates are roughly on
pace with the returns on its investments, there will be little income to be
allocated to Chan and Zuckerberg, and on which they will have to pay
tax.
The pass-through nature of a philanthropy LLC also mutes the initial
loss of the deductibility advantage. When CZI makes grants to donees
qualified to receive tax-deductible contributions, these deductions will
flow through to its member-owners. As such, whatever portion of the $3
billion it ultimately grants to § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charities in its
medical research program will generate potential tax deductions for
Zuckerberg and Chan.162
These deductions will only be potential tax deductions because all
charitable contribution deductions are subject to percentage limitations.
Donors to tax-exempt public charities can deduct only up to sixty percent
of their annual income based on their cash charitable contributions and
only up to thirty percent of their contributions of appreciated property.163
Somewhat lower percentage limits apply to contributions to private
foundations: thirty percent for cash contributions and twenty percent for
appreciated property.164 Even more importantly, the value of the
deduction for appreciated property also varies by the type of gift and type
of tax-exempt recipient. Gifts of appreciated property (except gifts of
clarity will come when the IRS issues guidance and regulations on the new deduction provision,
but at this point, access to the new pass-through deduction does not appear to be a significant
reason to elect the philanthropy LLC structure.
162. Unless it could qualify as an S corporation, see I.R.C. § 1361, a philanthropy organized
as a business corporation would be less tax efficient than an LLC. Corporate tax treatment always
raises the specter of double taxation, whereby the entity’s income is taxed once through the
corporate income tax as earned and again through the individual income tax when distributed to
owners. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 1.10 (3d ed.
2011). Charitable contributions by the philanthropic entity also would generate corporate
deductions only up to a ten-percent ceiling and would not pass through for use by individual
owners at all. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(2). Although the 2017 tax legislation reduced corporate rates,
for entities dedicated to philanthropy, these differences will likely swamp the potential value of
rate reduction.
163. See I.R.C. § 170(b)–(d).
164. See id.
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over ten percent of the stock of a single corporation) to public charities
generate deductions for the full fair market value of the asset; the same
gift to a private foundation will often generate a stepped down deduction
reduced for the donor’s unrecognized capital gains.165
Philanthropy LLC donors can preserve much of the value of the tax
treatment of charitable contributions of appreciated property. This is
hugely important for founders like Chan and Zuckerberg, who plan to
fund their LLC with stock.166 When Zuckerberg contributes his vastly
appreciated Facebook stock to CZI in exchange for membership interests,
the transaction will not wipe out his gains as would the same contribution
to a tax-exempt public charity. But the transaction also will not be a
taxable event.167 The stock will continue be Zuckerberg’s asset until the
LLC disposes of it.
If the LLC sells the stock, realizing a return, the gains (and associated
tax burden) would flow through to the owners. CZI, though, will often
have a much better option. When the funds it would generate through sale
of Facebook stock would be used to make grants to tax-exempt public
charities, it can simply grant them the Facebook stock instead. The
charitable recipients can then sell the stock tax-free. The donors (Chan
and Zuckerberg through CZI) avoid the tax on appreciated value and
obtain any available deduction. In theory, the percentage limits and lack
of a full market value deduction for donations to private foundations
could enable a transfer of appreciated assets to a philanthropy LLC
followed by a speedy donation to a public charity to yield a greater tax
benefit than the same transfer to a private foundation. Even outside of this
scenario, an LLC offers donors the ability to stage donations to take
maximum advantage of deductibility.
Comparing the philanthropy LLC strategy with conventional
alternatives yields less of a contrast than the initial categories of taxable
and tax-exempt would suggest. The income of a philanthropy LLC will
be taxable to its owners, but those owners have significant control over
how much will be earned and distributed. Contributions to found or fund
a philanthropy LLC will not be tax-deductible, but the grants the LLC
makes can generate deductions for its founder-owners. Prudent planning
will even allow them to take considerable advantage of the preferential
tax treatment of charitable gifts of appreciated property. In addition, with
the subset of donors under consideration here, income tax deductions like
these may simply not figure into their decision-making at all. Many will
165. Compare I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C), with § 170(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii), (e)(5). Note that
§ 170(e)(5) does allow a full market value deduction for donations of “qualified appreciated
stock” to private foundations. See I.R.C. § 170(e)(5).
166. Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
167. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
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have made prior charitable contributions that have maxed out their
percentage limitations for the foreseeable future, especially if they are
engaged in tax planning to keep their incomes relatively low.
Tax preferences for charities are also not set in stone.168 The 2017 tax
legislation did not directly target the charitable deduction, but the
increase in the standard deduction will shift many taxpayers from
itemizers to nonitemizers, the latter of whom gain no benefit from the
charitable deduction, thereby significantly undermining the tax benefits
of donating to nonprofit entities.169 The legislation’s reduction of tax rates
simultaneously reduces the value of charitable deductions for those
donors who continue to itemize and take them. In the past, some
reformers have even advocated narrowing the types of organizations that
qualify for tax-exemption.170 Donors considering disruptive philanthropy
face a dynamic income tax environment, and are wise to discount the
benefits of the current system in light of possible future changes.
B. Gift Tax Advantages
Income tax implications are not the only ones relevant to traditional
philanthropy, and that philanthropy LLC adopters would seem destined
to lose. The gift tax applies to any “transfer of property by gift,”171 for
less than full consideration. It subjects these transfers to tax rates as high
as forty percent.172 Gifts to tax-exempt charitable entities like private
foundations, however, avoid this potentially significant tax bite.173
Donors can deduct these contributions from the total amount of their gifts
upon which the annual tax is levied, and this deduction is subject to no
percentage or other limitations.174 Essentially, gifts to charity are taxexempt. But a gift to one of the philanthropy LLCs discussed here cannot
qualify for this exemption, and thus seems to portend sizable gift tax bill
for donors.
168. See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF
CHARITABLE GIVING (2011) (analyzing various alternatives for charitable tax reform).
169. See Ann Carrns, Charities Fear Tax Bill Will Cut Giving, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017)
at B5 (“A higher standard deduction means fewer taxpayers will itemize their deductions on their
tax returns, reducing the incentive to give to charities”); O’Neil & Parks, supra note 155
(“Nonprofit advocates are deeply worried about the impact of the tax law, especially the doubling
of the standard deduction for individual taxpayers. As a result of that provision, many Americans
will stop itemizing their taxes and will no longer get any tax benefit for charitable giving.”).
170. See, e.g., John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax-Exemption for NonProfit
Hospitals and Other Health Care Providers, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 2–9 (1992) (describing early
1990s debate over imposing charity care requirements for hospitals to retain tax exemption).
171. I.R.C. § 2501.
172. See id. § 2001(c) (imposing graduated rates up to forty percent).
173. See id. § 2522(a)(2).
174. See id. Contributions to § 501(c)(4) and § 501(c)(6) entities are also exempt from gift
taxation. See id. § 2501(a)(6).
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A transfer of assets to a philanthropy LLC, though, should actually be
irrelevant for gift tax purposes. Such a transaction is no gift at all. In
return for transfers of assets to their philanthropy LLCs, philanthropists
like Chan, Zuckerberg, Omidyar, and Powell Jobs receive memberships,
which vest in them ownership of the entity. In other words, these are
transfers for consideration. As such, philanthropy LLC founders should
avoid gift taxation just as founders of a small business do not pay gift tax
on their transfers of assets to the LLC or corporation organized to operate
their ventures. Of course, a philanthropic institution is a very odd type of
business—one which professes its desire to give away all or most of its
assets over time. The IRS might question whether the economic
substance of transfers to these unusual entities is properly understood to
provide consideration. The cards appear heavily stacked in philanthropy
LLC owners’ favor, though. They obtain control rights in return for the
assets they transfer to the entities they create, and these control rights
include the right to take back the assets should they decide to do so. It is
hard to see such a quid pro quo as a gift.
In the unlikely event the non-gift argument is unavailing, philanthropy
LLC founders could also use other arguments to avoid gift taxation. One
applies only to single-member LLCs, which are disregarded entities
under tax law;175 an LLC with two or more members is instead treated as
a pass-through.176 When an individual gives assets to her own singlemember LLC, there is no gift taxable event at all. The recipient entity is
disregarded, and tax law responds as if the donor made no transfer, and
thus, no gift.177 A single-member philanthropy LLC founder can handily
adopt this argument to backstop the earlier one about transfers for
consideration.
Of course, many donors—even among our small group of case
studies—do not act alone. If a donor transfers assets to an LLC with two
or more members and the transfer is deemed gratuitous, it would be
recognized for gift tax purposes just as if the transfer were made to a
partnership or corporation, unless the two members are spouses. The
unlimited marital deduction shelters all transfers between spouses from
the gift tax.178 Moreover, under a 2006 Revenue Procedure, those spouses

175. See I.R.S., supra note 145, at 2.
176. See id.
177. Note, however, that the disregarded nature of a single-member LLC cannot be used to
defeat the gift tax if an LLC owner gifts her interests in an LLC to a taxable individual or entity.
See Pierre v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 24, 35–36 (2009).
178. I.R.C. § 2523(a).
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in a community property state (like California) can create single member
(and thereby disregarded entity) LLCs.179
The potential for tax reform is less relevant here, as even the sweeping
changes in the 2017 tax legislation largely neglected specific gift tax
reforms.180 If the gift tax were swept away by another tax housecleaning
effort, any lingering concerns that founding a philanthropy LLC could
trigger it would disappear as well. But that seems unlikely. Even without
any changes, however, philanthropy LLC founders have little to fear from
the gift tax. Its apparent dangers for donors who take this route vanish on
closer inspection. As transfers in return for consideration, asset transfers
to philanthropy LLCs should entirely avoid characterization as gifts.
Failing that, the marital deduction and LLCs’ ability to operate as
disregarded entities offer additional routes to defer or avoid gift taxation.
C. Estate Tax Advantages
Nobody, of course, can avoid death. Of the tax burdens that choosing
a for-profit vehicle for one’s philanthropy will inflict, one might presume
the estate tax would be the most tenacious. The federal regime taxes “the
transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident
of the United States,” with top rates again at forty percent.181 A credit
doubled by the 2017 tax legislation fully shields over $11 million in
assets, but (absent truly shocking reversals) the donors contemplated here
will die with assets that vastly exceed that threshold.182 As for gift
taxation, deathtime transfers to private foundations and public charities

179. See Revenue Procedure 2002-69, FIRST AM. EXCHANGE CO., https://firstexchange.com/
revenue-procedure-2002-69/ (last visited June 9, 2018).
180. The two changes worked by the 2017 legislation were to increase from $14,000 to
$15,000 the amounts that may be excluded from determining gifts subject to taxation annually
and essentially doubling the lifetime credit for gift, estate and generation-skipping taxes. See
generally Allyson Versprille, Gift Tax Tweaks Could Lead to Unsavory Avoidance Tactics,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.bna.com/gift-tax-tweaks-n57982086495/ (discussing
changes to the tax code). The latter change, to the unified credits for both inter vivos and deathtime
gratuitous transfers, will be discussed in the next section on the estate tax.
181. See I.R.C. § 2001(a), (c).
182. The credit is actually a unified one, that includes both death and lifetime gratuitous
transfers. For 2017, it was $5,490,000. See Estate Tax, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/estate-tax/ (last updated May 9, 2018). Changes under the 2017
tax legislation raised it to over $11 million for 2018. Id. Spouses can combine their credits to
double these amounts. Ashlea Ebeling, IRS Announces 2018 Estate and Gift Tax Limits: $11.2
Million, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2017, 1:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017/
10/19/irs-announces-2018-estate-and-gift-tax-limits-11-2-million-per-couple/#6bb999ca4a4b. It
is always worth noting that this credit means very few estates pay any estate tax whatsoever, but
the potential founders of philanthropy LLCs are among the lucky few who will likely die with
estates large enough to surpass the available credits and remain subject to the tax.
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are fully deductible, with no percentage or other limitations.183 Assets
transferred to traditional nonprofit philanthropic organizations will not
count as part of the estate on which the tax is levied.184
A donor’s interest in a philanthropy LLC receives no such immunity
and will be a part of her taxable estate. But again, preparation offers a
way out. To avoid taxation, a philanthropy LLC founder need only create
an estate plan that transfers the assets remaining in her LLC at her death
in a way that qualifies for an available deduction. There are at least two
ready options. Any assets a taxpayer transfers to his or her surviving
spouse on death qualify for the unlimited marital deduction.185 Assets
transferred on death to a tax-exempt public charity or private foundation
also qualify for an unlimited charitable deduction.186 Married
philanthropy LLC founders will likely find it useful to deploy these tools
seriatim, providing for those assets they wish to remove from their
taxable estates to transfer to the surviving spouse on the death of the first
to die, and on the death of the survivor to a tax-exempt entity. An estate
plan including one’s philanthropy LLC holdings in transfers like these
elegantly defangs estate tax concerns.
Deathtime transfers do still expose one of the philanthropy LLC’s
unavoidable limitations. A private foundation can hold a family’s assets
through generations without any application of the estate tax. A
philanthropy LLC cannot function as such a perpetual tax-free vehicle,
which might transmit a family’s philanthropic values over time and future
generations. To avoid the estate tax, those with assets over the credit
amounts will need to transfer their LLC stakes to exempt entities on
death, or pay Uncle Sam his share.
Forsaking perpetuity will not matter much to the growing group of
philanthropists who have proclaimed their intention to spend down their
assets prior to death.187 This view of depleting one’s philanthropic assets
as a key goal contrasts with the vision of creating a perpetual endowment
183. See I.R.C. § 2055; see also RICHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 5–59 (9th ed. 2013) (“The estate tax charitable deduction . . . is unlimited in the sense
that it is not subject to percentage restrictions such as those applicable to the income tax deduction
for contributions to charity.”).
184. See I.R.C. § 2055.
185. See id. § 2056(a).
186. See id. § 2055.
187. See FRANCIE OSTROWER, LIMITED LIFE FOUNDATIONS: MOTIVATIONS, EXPERIENCES,
AND STRATEGIES 9–12 (2009), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30121/
411836-Limited-Life-Foundations-Motivations-Experiences-and-Strategies.PDF; see also
Veronica Dagher, The Rise of Spend-Down Philanthropy, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-rise-of-spend-down-philanthropy-1397242743 (reporting
findings from Bridgespan Group study). But see generally JOEL L. FLEISCHMAN, PUTTING WEALTH
TO WORK: PHILANTHROPY FOR TODAY OR INVESTING FOR TOMORROW? (2017) (mounting a
forceful critique of the spend-down philosophy).
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typical of earlier generations of donors. The modern cachet of spending
down also makes the philanthropy LLC’s inability to promise a perpetual
estate-tax-sheltered home for assets less problematic.
It is worth noting that estate planning makes sense even for donors
who strongly believe in spending down. The future is always uncertain.
At the moment, Powell Jobs, the Omidyars, Chan, and Zuckerberg are
alive and well, but life is unpredictable. And they will not be the first to
learn that it can be surprisingly difficult to spend large amounts of money.
Tax-avoiding transfers can be planned later if it becomes clear that a
spend-down goal will be unattainable during a founder’s lifetime, or as
the founders of a philanthropy LLC age or see their health falter. But
better safe than sorry. Founders should execute an estate plan directing
their LLCs’ holdings to a spouse, a tax-exempt charity, or both, just in
case.
Of course, a gambler might bet on a total repeal of the estate tax.
Although the cost of funding other tax cuts made eliminating the estate
tax impossible in 2017, there is no reason to believe this concession has
changed conservatives’ devotion estate tax repeal.188 Savvy donors must
at least account for the possibility that repeal eventually will render the
estate tax charitable contribution deduction superfluous, regardless of the
forms their philanthropic ventures take.
***
The philanthropy LLC sounds at first like a very expensive—if not
foolish—strategy. Close review, however, reveals that with careful
planning a philanthropy LLC is a very attractive alternative to the heavily
regulated, public, and permanent version of philanthropy tax-exempt
structures present. The real tax costs a philanthropy LLC imposes are
simply not as large as one might suppose. The very high-profile and
sophisticated donors profiled here are willing to tolerate these costs in
exchange for enhanced flexibility, privacy, and control. If tax regimes
continue to shift in ways that reduce the benefits of adopting a traditional
nonprofit vehicle, the appeal of this kind of disruptive philanthropy will
only increase.

188. See Speaker Paul Ryan, First Major Speech on Tax Reform at the National Association
of Manufacturers 2017 Manufacturing Summit (June 20, 2017), https://www.speaker.gov/pressrelease/full-text-speaker-ryans-first-major-speech-tax-reform (claiming that as part of its tax
reform agenda, Congress “will eliminate harmful, burdensome taxes including the death tax”);
then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump, An America First Economic Plan: Winning the Global
Competition, Remarks on Repealing the Death Tax at the Detroit Economic Club (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/08/08/trump-economic-speech-detroit/) (promising, while on the
campaign trail, that “no family will have to pay the death tax”).
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IV. THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR
There are only so many Silicon Valley tech fortunes. If the
philanthropy LLC can only appeal to this extremely select group, it would
be hard to call it a trend. But there are good reasons to believe this
innovation will spread to potential donors further down the high net worth
chain. Although these very wealthy individuals will not necessarily share
the penchant for disruption of West Coast tech startup founders, many of
the characteristics that make the philanthropy LLC attractive to the
Zuckerbergs of the world will also entice the millionaire next door.189
A. The Likelihood of Adoption
There are more extremely wealthy individuals and families than the
average Jane struggling to save for retirement might imagine. A 2017
global report found over 225,000 “ultra high-net-worth individuals:”190
those with over $30 million in investable assets.191 The total number grew
3.5% from the prior year’s tally, and more than 73,000 of these
individuals reside in the United States.192 Looking to those (only) “highnet-worth individuals”—with a (measly) one million dollars or more in
investable assets—yields a bumper crop of potential philanthropy LLC
adopters. A 2017 report estimates this group to be over 16.5 million
strong globally, with nearly 5.2 million in the U.S. alone.193
Together, these wealthy individuals and families control trillions of
dollars of assets, and large portions of this wealth will predictably be
dedicated to philanthropic pursuits. For example, the annual Giving USA
Report found donors contributed roughly $40 billion to private
foundations in 2016.194 If the attraction of the philanthropy LLC is its
relative advantages compared with a private foundation, there is
considerable market share for it to gain.
Whether the many millionaires next door will be swayed to adopt a
philanthropy LLC structure will depend primarily on their assessment of
189. This term was popularized by Thomas J. Stanley in his book of the same name. See
generally THOMAS J. STANLEY, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR (1996) (repeatedly using the term
“millionaire next door”).
190. See WEALTH X, WORLD ULTRA WEALTH REPORT 2017, 1, https://www.wealthx.com/
report/exclusive-uhnwi-analysis-the-world-ultra-wealth-report-2017/#downloadform.
191. See id.; see also Ultra High Net Worth Individual (UHNWI), INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/ultra-high-net-worth-individuals-uhnwi.asp (last visited
June 9, 2018) (“Ultra high-net-worth individuals (UHNWI) are people with investable assets of
at least $30 million . . . .”).
192. See WEALTH X, supra note 190, at 22.
193. See CAPGEMINI, WORLD WEALTH REPORT 2017, 7, https://www.capgemini.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/worldwealthreport_2017_final.pdf.
194. See See the Numbers – Giving USA 2017 Infographic, GIVING USA (June 12, 2017),
https://givingusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Giving-USA-2017-Infographic.jpg.
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the tradeoff discussed above. For high-net-worth individuals with a lower
profile than the Silicon Valley tech elite, privacy may not be so critical.
Part of the mystique of unmasking the “millionaire next door” was that
nobody knew about them.195 Their anonymity may make transparency a
nonissue. Alternatively, it could make privacy ever more valuable. It is
fair to assume that millionaires’ tastes for privacy will vary. Some of
these potential philanthropists will care little about the privacy the LLC
structure offers, others will value being spared the spotlight; still others
will want to showcase some of their philanthropic efforts and keep others
to themselves. Whatever one’s personal preferences around privacy, the
appeal of flexibility and control are universal.
The tremendous growth of donor-advised funds bolsters this
intuition.196 Unlike a private foundation, a donor-advised fund is not a
standalone philanthropic institution, but rather a separate account within
a preexisting public charity. 197 When a donor contributes assets to her
account, the public charity receives and holds them, and the donor may
take a current deduction for her contribution.198 She may also provide
nonbinding advice on both how the fund’s assets should be invested and
to whom grants from it should ultimately be made.199
Donor-advised funds preserve donors’ deductibility benefits while
being less expensive to establish and maintain than private
foundations.200 They avoid many, though not all, of the private
foundation rules’ restrictions.201 They are also more private. Although the
public charity of which a donor-advised fund is a part remains within
federal and state regulators’ purview, individual donor-advised funds are
subject to no such oversight. On the down side, a donor-advised fund does
195. See STANLEY, supra note 189, at 30 (explaining that the typical American millionaire
appear to their neighbors as “nondescript, middle class folks”).
196. See Roger Colinvaux, Donor Advised Funds: Charitable Spending Vehicles for 21st
Century Philanthropy, 92 WASH. L. REV. 39, 40 (2017) (reporting various indicators of this
growth, including the fact that “an astonishing five of the top eleven recipients for charitable gifts
in the United States are sponsoring organizations of donor advised funds”).
197. See I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2) (2018) (providing the tax definition of “donor-advised fund”);
see also Colinvaux, supra note 196, at 43–44 (describing donor-advised funds in an article
analyzing the major policy questions they raise).
198. See Colinvaux, supra note 196, at 43–44.
199. See I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii) (2018) (defining a donor-advised fund to include “a fund
or account . . . with respect to which a donor . . . has, or reasonably expects to have, advisory
privileges with respect to the distribution or investment of amounts held in such fund or account
by reason of the donor’s status as a donor”).
200. In fact, because donor-advised fund contributions are treated as made to public charities,
they typically offer greater deductibility benefits than would a private foundation. See Colinvaux,
supra note 196, at 52–53.
201. For example, under reforms included in the Pension Protection Act of 2006, donoradvised funds are subject to the private foundation excess-business-holdings regime. See I.R.C.
§ 4943(e).
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not allow a donor to create her own institution, staff it, and set its
priorities, and she must relinquish ultimate control over the assets it
holds. That said, donor advice tends to be powerful and rarely ignored. A
donor-advised fund can be seen as a private foundation “lite” or a kind of
(not very) poor man’s private foundation. Although the pros and cons of
donor-advised funds and philanthropy LLCs differ, those who opt for
donor-advised funds make their decisions using the same kind of cost–
benefit analysis that predicts wider adoption of the philanthropy LLC.
Perhaps the freedom from regulation the philanthropy LLC offers will
also be particularly attractive to individuals with only somewhat smaller
fortunes to devote to philanthropy. After all, a mere multimillionaire
should think more carefully about the extra costs of compliance a private
foundation entails than should Priscilla Chan. The same is true, though,
when considering the forgone tax benefits attendant to these
philanthropic vehicles. The philanthropy LLC structure can trim these
costs considerably, but not entirely eliminate them. The somewhat less
staggeringly wealthy will have a smaller cushion to cover the relatively
higher tax burden of a philanthropy LLC. Those millionaires anxious to
avoid sending any extra dollars to the IRS also will not easily be
converted to disruptive philanthropy. For those high-net-worth
individuals willing to tolerate somewhat higher tax bills, though, the
philanthropy LLC’s extensive freedom to invest, manage and advocate
as they choose will be a draw.
Some high-net-worth donors have already demonstrated their
willingness to sacrifice tax benefits in order to pursue their social goals.
Warren Buffet’s 2011 New York Times op-ed calling for Congress to
“raise rates immediately on taxable income in excess of $1 million”
comes quickly to mind.202 But less public and more relevant examples are
also available. Social welfare organizations organized under § 501(c)(4)
are a common tool for donors interested in political activities from which
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are restricted or barred, despite their inability
to receive tax-deductible contributions.203 Practitioners also report an
uptick in donor interest in using both these § 501(c)(4) entities and
business leagues organized under § 501(c)(6) to coordinate their
philanthropic activities, although neither structure offers donors
deductibility under the income or estate tax.204 By utilizing these vehicles,
wealthy individuals and families are already leaving potential tax benefits
on the table.

202. See Warren E. Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html.
203. See Brody & Owens, supra note 117, at 864–65.
204. See Brakman Reiser, Lincoln & Mittermeier, supra note 121.
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Donors adopt these alternatives despite foregone tax benefits because
of the other advantages they provide. Social welfare organizations and
business leagues are by definition not subject to the private foundation
rules; they are free to engage in more political activity than their
§ 501(c)(3) counterparts;205 and they can provide donors with greater
privacy.206 Unlike a philanthropy LLC, these forms generally retain tax
exemption for organizational income.207 As social welfare organizations
and business leagues are formed as state law nonprofits, though, they do
not offer donors the kind of extensive control found in for-profit
philanthropic alternatives. Founders of a § 501(c)(4) or § 501(c)(6) entity
will not be able to change their minds and reclaim their donated assets
down the line. Attorneys advising high-net-worth clients about these
alternatives will certainly add the philanthropy LLC to the mix of options
they detail—if they have not already.
The growth in “family offices” also bodes well for wider adoption of
the philanthropy LLC model. A family office is “a private investment
firm that exclusively manages [a] family’s wealth, often with a long-term,
multi-generational perspective.”208 A 2016 report estimated that “there
are at least 10,000 single family offices in existence globally and at least
half of these were set up in the last 15 years.”209 In addition to
coordinating investments, family offices frequently manage a family’s
philanthropic pursuits, often by coordinating transfers of wealth to the
family’s private foundation or donor-advised funds. Philanthropy LLC
structures would allow donors to bring these efforts entirely in-house,
205. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
206. See Brody & Owens, supra note 117, at 864–65 (explaining that the major benefit of
utilizing a § 501(c)(4) entity, rather than an explicitly politically exempt entity organized under
Code § 527, is privacy). Section 527 organizations must publicly disclose every donor of more
than $200 but donors to § 501(c)(4) organizations until recently remained confidential within the
IRS. See id. The Trump administration’s recent removal of requirements that social welfare
organizations and other non-charitable exempt entities disclose donor information to the IRS will
only make these forms more attractive. See Rev. Proc. 2018-38, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irsdrop/rp-18-38.pdf (announcing removal of donor disclosure requirements for (c)(4) and other
non-charitable exempt entities, but not 527 organizations). Numerous helpful articles on the use
and regulation of § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations can be found in the symposium issue
at 21 N.Y.U. J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2018).
207. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2018). But see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
(explaining the potential limitations on (c)(4) entities’ exemptions when they make political
expenditures).
208. Nathan Crow & Gregory S. Crespi, The Family Office Exclusion Under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 69 SMU L. REV. 97, 99 (2016).
209. EY, EY FAMILY OFFICE GUIDE 5 (2016), https://familybusiness.eyvx.com/pdfs/1003023-family-office-guide-v3-lr.pdf. A “single” family office manages the wealth
of a single family, as compared with “multifamily offices” that service two or more families. Crow
& Crespi, supra note 208, at 102.
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within existing family offices or new ones formed to include such
purposes. The transition would be particularly seamless for the many
family offices already structured as LLCs or groups of LLCs. Indeed, at
least one of the marquis examples described here has already been
recognized to function this way; investment industry sources often refer
to the Emerson Collective as a family office.210
Family offices share not only structural elements with the
philanthropy LLC, but also many of its most appealing characteristics.
After reviewing the existing research on single family offices (SFOs), one
commentator concluded, “[w]hat is evident from the literature is why the
very affluent are increasingly using SFOs – they value factors such as
privacy, control, flexibility and individualized service.”211 These wealthy
families have spent millions to create bespoke family offices to maximize
their flexibility, protect the family from scrutiny, and ensure the family’s
control. Organizing a philanthropy LLC, or incorporating one into an
existing family office structure, is a natural next step.
For-profit philanthropy’s appeal is likely to spread beyond the rarefied
circles of Silicon Valley’s technology magnates. Today’s swelling
inequality means the rich continue to get richer, making more assets
available for philanthropic pursuits. As their ranks increase, both
domestically and globally, so does their sophistication in wealth
management. At least some in this wealthy and powerful group are
willing to tolerate relatively higher tax burdens in order to achieve their
social goals. Innovative advisors and high-profile examples like CZI
ensure they will soon discover the philanthropy LLC’s advantages in
flexibility, privacy and control—and many will adopt it.
B. The Stakes for Society
Growth of philanthropy LLCs will impact the philanthropic sector and
influence society at large. Some of these effects should be cause for
celebration; others are causes for concern. Although current law offers
few tools to impede the growth of philanthropy LLCs, it remains
important to identify the trend’s benefits and drawbacks. Greater clarity
will enable adopters and their counsel to understand the import of

210. See e.g., Emerson Collective, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/
organization/emerson-collective (last visited June 7, 2018); Emerson Collective, VENTUREDEAL,
http://www.venturedeal.com/VentureCapitalFirmProfiles/Emerson%20Collective.aspx (last
visited June 7, 2018).
211. Heinrich Liechtenstein et al., Single Family Offices: The Art of Effective Wealth
Management, in FAMILY VALUES AND VALUE CREATION: THE FOSTERING OF ENDURING VALUES
WITHIN FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESSES 171 (Joseph Tapias & John L. Ward eds., 2008). A single
family office serves only one family, while multifamily offices count several families among their
clients. See id. at 170.
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individual decisions to utilize philanthropy LLCs more fully, and can
guide policy makers as they develop responses.
1. A Capital Infusion for Social Good
The most important advantage of an increase in philanthropy LLC
structures is its potential to draw more capital into efforts to tackle serious
societal issues. As detailed above, a philanthropy LLC’s assets can be
used in ways far beyond those permitted for assets contributed to
traditional, nonprofit charity. To the extent this is money that would
otherwise not be spent on achieving social good, society benefits. If as
many high-net-worth individuals as possible give less of their wealth to
their children, buy fewer yachts and vacation homes, and instead try to
improve the lives of those less fortunate and save the planet, it is hard to
be ungrateful. Even if they decide to take the assets back later, renting
those assets is a potentially huge societal win.
The soft underbelly of this argument, of course, lies in considering
where this capital would be deployed if it were not devoted to for-profit
philanthropic vehicles. If philanthropy LLCs displace asset-hoarding or
rapacious consumption, they are surely a positive force. If these structures
instead crowd out donations to more traditional nonprofit institutions,
more caution is advisable. A knee-jerk reaction against philanthropy
LLCs out of unfounded fears of crowding out is unwarranted, but this is
an important empirical problem for further study.212
If evidence ultimately demonstrates that funding for philanthropy
LLCs and other for-profit philanthropic vehicles does crowd out
donations to conventional charities, concern is appropriate. The
traditional, nonprofit philanthropic sector has been an important positive
force in American society for over a century. Private foundations in
particular supported early civil rights litigation,213 developed the 911
system,214 and have financed countless scientific breakthroughs and
artistic masterworks.215 Since 1969, they have done so while complying
with regulations that channel them toward steady, annual spending on
212. An early study of impact investing shows it has displaced only a small amount of
charitable giving, but the researchers did not specifically study the philanthropy LLC. See U.S.
TR. & THE LILLY FAMILY SCH. OF PHILANTHROPY, supra note 56.
213. See Lynn Walker, The Role of Foundations in Helping to Reach the Civil Rights Goals
of the 1980s, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 1055, 1058–62 (1985) (describing the Ford Foundation’s deep
involvement in funding the NAACP during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s as well as
other civil rights litigation efforts).
214. See JOEL L. FLEISCHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET; HOW
PRIVATE WEALTH IS CHANGING THE WORLD 61 (2007) (describing the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation’s leadership in developing the 911 emergency response system).
215. See generally id. (providing one hundred case studies of the impact and outcome of
foundations’ grantmaking programs).
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grants to public charities, careful stewardship, and considerable
transparency. Upsetting this apple cart could risk weakening the
philanthropic sector and its public bent.
These risks of disruptive philanthropy, however, counsel caution
rather than condemnation. Traditional nonprofit philanthropies are not
without flaws. Nonprofit production can be highly inefficient. The
considerable regulation imposed on nonprofit philanthropies can stifle
innovation. The lobbying and campaign restrictions imposed on taxexempt entities can muzzle political involvement by those who would
speak on behalf of the powerless.216 If the restrictions on traditional
philanthropic institutions are viewed in this vein, the philanthropy LLC’s
ability to bolster charitable donations with impact investments and direct
political advocacy becomes a welcome salve.
Even if the legal strictures placed on traditional nonprofit
philanthropies were ideal and perfect, nonprofit law in action is also a far
cry from the way it appears on the books. Regulators in this sphere are
chronically underfunded.217 This lack of enforcement resources
considerably undermines any advantages the nonprofit regulatory
architecture can be expected to provide. To be rigorous, assessments of
the comparative value philanthropy LLCs create should look honestly at
more traditional philanthropic vehicles and their regulatory environment,
warts and all.
Another important benefit of the rise of philanthropy LLCs is its
impact on the wider for-profit sector. Disruptive philanthropy is tied to
other trends blurring the boundary between traditionally charitable and
business endeavors. Corporate philanthropy is a longstanding
phenomenon,218 but in recent decades it has become far more strategic.
Though few corporations have taken Google and GM’s extreme course
of bringing their philanthropic programs inside the walls of their forprofit businesses, today’s corporations are widely aligning their
philanthropic programs more tightly with their business concerns.219
216. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 106, at 61–62 (arguing for the removal of many of
these restrictions).
217. See Brody & Owens, supra note 117, at 865–66 (describing the lack of resources at the
IRS, particularly in the aftermath of the (c)(4) scandal); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen,
Duties of Nonprofit Corporate Directors-Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1845, 1879 n.163 (2012) (reviewing the literature describing state nonprofit regulators’ lack
of resources).
218. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, PHILANTHROPY AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 31–
78 (1972) (describing the state of corporate philanthropy 45 years ago).
219. See, e.g., Caroline Preston, Rethinking Corporate Giving: Western Union’s CEO Offers
Her Philosophy, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (June 3, 2010), https://www.philanthropy.com/
article/Rethinking-Corporate-Giving/160569 (“When I first started out in business, corporate
philanthropy meant presenting an oversized check and going home. For the most part, those days
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Today’s programs address supply chain management by contributing to
environmental remediation efforts where there key imports are located or
labor continuity through training efforts that increase the supply of
qualified employees, rather than simply making feel-good grants to the
Red Cross or cultural organizations.
Similarly, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become de
rigueur. Corporate philanthropy programs make direct grants to
charitable entities. CSR instead involves permeating business decisions
with social and environmental considerations in order to take better
account of a business’ comprehensive impact.220 It is now difficult to find
a major company without a CSR agenda. Critics can easily challenge the
authenticity and effectiveness of these programs, but one cannot ignore
their ubiquity.221 Social enterprises—businesses that pursue a dual
mission of earning profits for owners and generating social good—are
likewise on the rise,222 as are the impact investments that help fund
them.223
These developments all share a foundational belief that business can
be a force for good. Disruptive philanthropy is of a piece with them. As
philanthropy LLCs grow in prominence and popularity, they broadcast
the capacity of for-profit entities to be part of the project of innovating
for social good—and encourage businesses to continue to follow suit.224

are over.”). The work of Michael Porter and Mark Kramer has been influential in this shift. See
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy,
HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, 1, 1, https://sharedvalue.org/sites/default/files/resourcefiles/Competitive_Advantage.pdf.
220. See Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility, FT.COM/LEXICON,
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR) (describing the CSR
concept and movement and offering the approach of Unilever as one representative example).
221. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 6–12 (2005) (describing the pervasiveness of CSR).
222. See Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 2017 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 92, 95 (“In recent years, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of
organizations that combine profit-seeking with an altruistic or social mission.”).
223. See generally ANTONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING:
TRANSFORMING HOW WE MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE (2011) (describing impact
investment, its growth, and its adopters); NEW FRONTIERS OF PHILANTHROPY: A GUIDE TO THE
NEW TOOLS AND ACTORS RESHAPING GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND SOCIAL INVESTING (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2014) (discussing social investment and its philanthropic impact).
224. Matthew Bishop and Michael Green present a strong argument for the value of blending
the business and nonprofit spheres in PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN SAVE THE
WORLD (2008) (discussing how “philanthrocapitalism” could have an impact on social problems
throughout the world). Still, these trends are not without their detractors. Michael Edwards,
longtime foundation manager and Director of Governance and Civil Society at the Ford
Foundation, has cautioned that the turn toward for-profit solutions more broadly may be a fad
with dangerous risks. See MICHAEL EDWARDS, JUST ANOTHER EMPEROR? 82–91 (2008).
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2. Magnifying Elite Influence
Despite the philanthropy LLC trend’s potential benefits, it is not
without costs. The potential for crowding out has already been addressed.
In addition, philanthropy LLCs tend to magnify the most negative aspect
of traditional nonprofit giving: essentially, that it is elitist. For all of the
good that wealthy individuals can do by devoting their fortunes to worthy
causes, it means these wealthy individuals are the ones who decide which
causes are the worthy ones, and what kinds of solutions to try. The rich
already possess outsized power in our society. From Carnegie and
Vanderbilt in the Gilded Age to Gates and Buffet in our own, amassing a
mega fortune has earned the successful both civic admiration and public
suspicion.
In his new and much-discussed book, David Callahan paints an
unnerving picture of the power of elite philanthropy.225 In his words,
“[p]rivate funders have been pushing more energetically into
public life even as many ordinary people have been
withdrawing—and even as a key means by which citizens do
things together, government, is foundering.”226
He is not alone in worrying about the dark side of elite philanthropy.
Legal scholars have identified the paternalism and even colonialism on
display in traditional nonprofit organizations.227 Political scientist Rob
Reich recounts the “many antidemocratic features” of private
foundations, including their lack of accountability, limited transparency,
and empowerment of the dead hand.228 In her extensive research inside
four of America’s most elite foundations, Megan Tompkins-Stange found
that even grant makers themselves are disquieted by their industry’s lack
of accountability and transparency.229 Although these scholars ultimately
225. See generally CALLAHAN, supra note 50; see also, e.g., Pablo Eisenberg, Time for a New
Movement: Clamp Down on “The Givers” Who are Taking Too Much from Average Americans,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (July 6, 2017), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Opinion-TheGivers-Are/240543 (reviewing CALLAHAN, supra note 50, and expanding on its themes); Alana
Semuels, The Problem with Modern Philanthropy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/the-problem-with-philanthropy/520989/
(discussing CALLAHAN, supra note 50, and other critiques of elite philanthropy).
226. See CALLAHAN, supra note 50, at 285.
227. See Garry W. Jenkins, Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them:
Lessons of the Anti-NGO Movement, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 459, 479–92 (2012) (collecting legal
and other critiques of NGOs, including private foundations, from the left and right); Eric Franklin
Amarante, The Perils of Philanthrocapitalism 29–35 (Feb. 27, 2018) (unpublished research paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2885550.
228. See Reich, supra note 12, at 67–70.
229. See MEGAN E. TOMPKINS-STANGE, POLICY PATRONS: PHILANTHROPY, EDUCATION
REFORM, AND THE POLITICS OF INFLUENCE 131–41 (2016).
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find these deficits do not make private foundations fundamentally
incompatible with democracy, these attributes make it a close call.230 If
democracy needs to fear private foundations’ potential for plutocracy,
philanthropy LLCs represent yet greater peril.231 They seriously
underperform private foundations on the dimensions of accountability
and transparency—and do so by design.
By maximizing founder control, philanthropy LLCs insulate their
founders not only from public scrutiny, but also from outside input.
Callahan’s work collects the stories of a number of philanthropists who
have been overconfident in their ability to port their success in business
over to the philanthropic context.232 Some of them point this out for
themselves; others have yet to learn this valuable lesson.233 Critics also
chastise some elite philanthropists’ failures to attend to the interests and
ideas of the very beneficiaries they purport to help.234 Elite
philanthropists operating traditional nonprofit structures can easily act
alone, with input from a few family members, or as part of a managing
group drawn from socioeconomic and educational backgrounds similar
to their own. Their governance arrangements can make it difficult to
obtain ideas and feedback from beneficiaries, and the philanthropy LLC
does nothing to remedy this structural flaw. Philanthropy LLC founders
can make a point of seeking beneficiary input, as some foundations and
grant makers do,235 but nothing in the form encourages such efforts.
Much of the regulatory apparatus restricting private foundations was
enacted to prevent wealthy elites from using their philanthropic vehicles
to amplify their already considerable influence on society. The political
restrictions are the most obvious example, but even seemingly more
technical rules are addressed in part to this concern. The five percent
payout requirement236 prevents the affluent from stockpiling all of their
funds indefinitely and forces them to spend it on current societal needs,
at least as determined by the tax code’s definition of qualifying charitable
recipients. The excess-business-holdings regime237 prevents a business
230. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 12, at 80–81.
231. See Amarante, supra note 227, at 60–62.
232. See CALLAHAN, supra note 50, at 118 (“Making a bundle in software or short trading
doesn’t mean you’ll know the first thing about, say, K-12 education, and it’s easy for misguided
philanthropists to do a lot of damage . . . .”); see also Amarante, supra note 227, at 60–62
(characterizing this as the problem of “amateurism”).
233. See CALLAHAN, supra note 50, at 119.
234. See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 227, at 489.
235. See, e.g., TOMPKINS-STANGE, supra note 229, at 55–56 (describing some foundations’
embrace of “field-oriented” philanthropy, which “value[s] the democratic engagement of broad
populations in decision-making processes as opposed to focusing on efficient and effective
outcomes”).
236. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2018).
237. See generally id. § 4943 (describing the taxes on excess business holdings).
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owner from ostensibly stepping away from control of a business while
maintaining her hold from the comfort of a private foundation. The
transparency required by tax-exempt entities not only enables
enforcement but also forces the efforts of these potential power-brokers
into the light, where the media and the public may scrutinize them.
All of this regulation comes by way of a very particular bargain. The
government makes available tax-favored vehicles like private
foundations, but allows philanthropists to use them only if they comply
with the web of regulations intended to channel their efforts and curb their
influence. The bargain falls apart if donors are willing to give up the tax
advantages on offer, as do adopters of the philanthropy LLC.
Philanthropy LLC founders need not concern themselves with complying
with the private foundation rules. They can invest and donate as they
please, on the schedule they desire, including to lobbying efforts and
political campaigns, and all without surrendering the protection of tax
confidentiality.
Not only do these individual bargains go by the wayside, but the
advent of disruptive philanthropy threatens to undercut private
foundation law generally as an important lever for disciplining and
curtailing elite power. Philanthropy LLC pioneers like Powell Jobs,
Omidyar, Chan, and Zuckerberg shine a light on the path away from
social control over the good they wish to see in the world. Their examples
demonstrate how donors can reject the philanthropic deal on offer for the
past five decades and instead embrace flexibility, privacy, and control.
All it costs is a few more tax dollars, maybe not even so many more tax
dollars as would initially appear. As more high-net-worth individuals
adopt this tactic, tax regulation diminishes as a mechanism for observing
and channeling our most powerful elites.238
3. Prospects for Reform
It is hard to tote up the benefits and detriments of greater use of
disruptive philanthropy. On the one hand, the empirical question of how
much more capital it unleashes for valuable prosocial activities is
essentially irresolvable. On the other, its costs to democracy and equality
are impossible to value. The difficulty in calculating the difference
between these unknowables only increases the challenge of evaluating
policy responses.

238. It also may divide the world of philanthropy into those merely wealthy who can afford
only the more public and heavily regulated private foundation or donor-advised fund route that
comes with tax concessions, and the truly carefree rich, who can foot the somewhat higher tax bill
associated with the more flexible and private philanthropy LLC. I thank Kerry Ryan for this
insight.
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The philanthropy LLC is not an avenue law can easily foreclose with
a targeted fix.239 Tax law could rejigger the tradeoff that philanthropists
face when considering their options by increasing tax benefits attendant
to private foundations or reducing the regulatory costs they impose.
Neither approach seems particularly feasible or attractive. In light of
widespread concerns over the pro-wealthy cast of the 2017 tax
legislation,240 new proposals to reduce tax revenue by transparently
increasing giveaways to the rich would seem to have dim political
prospects. Reducing regulation might be more politically palatable, but
dismantling the private foundation rules would counterproductively
increase the very risks of elite influence that a response to the
philanthropy LLC should combat.
Envisioning reforms to discourage philanthropy LLCs by increasing
their costs or reducing their benefits is equally challenging. Tax law
might penalize or prohibit charitable deductions for donations run
through an LLC, but LLCs are an incredibly popular business form.241 It
will be difficult to limit such an anti-abuse rule to philanthropy LLCs
alone without explicitly targeting the rich in a highly unusual manner. It
is likewise hard to see how investment, political, and operational
restrictions and transparency requirements could legitimately be imposed
only on philanthropy LLCs, especially without some tie to tax or other
government benefits sought by their owners.
Policymakers could reject such surgical solutions to tame the
philanthropy LLC in favor of broader responses to tackle societal
inequality, of which this structure is only one small manifestation.
Reformers could overhaul tax, business, and election law to limit elite
influence and democratize our society. The philanthropy LLC would be
easy to cabin or eliminate as part of such a radical reform effort.
Realistically, though, this kind of reckoning is quite far off. If recent
experience is any guide, our tax law is not going to become considerably
more progressive in the near term, and limited liability companies and
their preferential tax treatment are here to stay. Election law has been
239. But see Amarante, supra note 227, at 64–66 (arguing it would be possible, albeit very
unlikely, to create and enforce a licensing requirement for philanthropic activity).
240. In a CNN poll in December 2017, shortly before final passage of the tax package, sixtysix percent of respondents answered that they thought “the tax reform proposals made by the
Republicans in Congress will do more . . . to benefit the wealthy” than the middle class. See SSRS,
CNN DECEMBER 2017 POLL 6 (2017), http://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2017/images/12/18/rel12a..trump.and.taxes.pdf.
241. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of
the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 20042007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459,
464 (2010) (describing the ascent of the LLC business form and reporting results of a study
showing “that the LLC is now undeniably the most popular form of new business entity in
America”).
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loosening restrictions rather than tightening them of late. The idea that
individuals can use their own assets more or less as they wish will
likewise be hard to dislodge, and rightly so. Private property is the
bedrock of our legal system. Donors who do not seek any kind of tax or
other public benefit in return for their largesse will most likely continue
to be able to invest as they wish, donate to causes and candidates, and
maintain their privacy as they do so.
***
In the absence of targeted or large-scale policy responses to the
philanthropy LLC, donors and their advisors can still be sensitized to the
societal risks attendant to this model. They can be exhorted to weigh them
in their calculus as they decide among philanthropic alternatives.
Scholars and the media can attempt to tarnish the halo of philanthropy
LLC founders by dispelling any false sense that their public pledges
establish a transparent or permanent charitable endowment.
Commentators can also expose philanthropy LLC founders who
ultimately renege on their promises and take back or redirect resources
they pledged to pursue social good—if and when they do so. But many
donors will still find the tradeoff the philanthropy LLC offers compelling.
Even a more educated public may not care very much, or for very long.
And they may be right. The potentially enormous societal return on
philanthropy LLC funders’ investments could be worth the risks they
entail.
CONCLUSION
Chan and Zuckerberg are not the first to see the value in the
philanthropy LLC, and they are very unlikely to be the last. Ultra highnet-worth individuals, the high-net-worth cohort just below them, and
even the millionaire next door will soon be considering this newly
publicized philanthropic alternative. Many will like what they find. An
LLC structure can raise the tax burden of philanthropy somewhat, but in
return it offers an enticing blend of flexibility, privacy, and control. While
these are attractive attributes for donors, they do raise concerns for
society more broadly. The regulatory burden imposed on tax-exempt,
nonprofit vehicles channels elite philanthropy, and subjects it to some
degree of transparency. Sidestepping this regime will make
philanthropy—and its already privileged and influential purveyors—
more powerful and less public. Fortunately, this kind of disruptive
philanthropy also has the exciting potential to draw new and greater
assets to the cause of social good.
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